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SOCIAL JUSTICE
A philosophy of praxis cannot but present itself at the outset
in a polemical and critical guise, as superseding the existing
mode of thinking and existing concrete thought (the existing
cultural world). First of all, therefore, it must be a criticism of
"common sense", basing itself initially, however, on common
sense in order to demonstrate that "everyone" is a philosopher
and that it is not a question of introducing from scratch a
scientific form of thought into everyone's individual life, but of
renovating and making "critical" an already existing activity.1
INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to introduce a reader, not privy to the current debate on
European private law, to what is understood by "social dimension" within
it. Indeed, the idea is quite minimal and it has been spelled out recently in
"Social Justice in European Contract Law: A Manifesto" 2 ("Social Justice
Manifesto" or "Manifesto"). In this article, a group of scholars have
dedicated a few academic meetings to express the feeling that the current
"technocratic" clothing of legal Europe is highly questionable; that
European private law cannot be constructed as a merely technical or neutral
exercise of institution building, but rather its "political dimension" should
be clearly recognized; that, to the contrary, Brussels handles the European
private law process as a matter strictly functional to the needs of the
construction of an open market; and that what suffers in this process is
"social justice."3
While the foes of the project are clearly spelled out in the Manifesto
as the "technocrats and bureaucrats" in Brussels, a lot of self-restraint is
exercised when it comes to a self critique of the role of legal academia in
the process of Europeanization of private law. In contrast, we portray as
deeply problematic the many issues related to a line of scholarship now
developing as a well-founded industry by the institutions in Brussels.
1. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMscI
330-31 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans., 10th prtg., Int'l
Publishers 1989) (1971). One can also see the influence of Gramsci in the work of
PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND
POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIES (1993).
2. Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, Social Justice in European
Contract Law: A Manifesto, 10 EuR. L.J. 653 (2004) [hereinafter Social Justice
Manifesto].
3. See generally id (discussing the meaning of a social dimension in European private
law discourse).
4. While some resource-controlling scholars are more ready to yield to a pattern of
influence and prestige connected to the self-appointed role of "private legislators,"
2006]
NEW ENGLAND LA WREVIEW
This Article aims to show what the political, rather than the technical
stakes, are in the current debate over the harmonization of private law in
Europe. Part One analyzes the main actors, the legal sources, the
ideological divide, and the process animating the current debate on
European private law. It sheds light on the incremental transformation of
European private law in a scholarly industry. Part Two sheds light on the
main obstacles and inconsistencies that jurists encounter in envisioning a
Social private law. This section argues that the notion of the "Social" in
private law scholarship as well as the idea of "Social Europe" is rarely a
useful notion to articulate a progressive agenda for European private law.
Finally, Part Three offers some modest proposals of the methodological
and strategic nature on the possibilities and the limitations of setting a
progressive agenda for European private law. We argue that a progressive
agenda for European private law can be conceived today as a significant
platform only by breaking with the current hegemonies and ideologies, as
well as by unveiling the transformation of European private law into a
scholarly industry.
In light of Antonio Gramsci's notion of a philosophy of praxis, we
hope that this paper will spark further thoughts and self-criticism on current
mainstream, progressive, and neo-liberal projects tackling the
harmonization of private law in the European Union.
I. THE EUROPEANIZATION OF PRIVATE LAW: LEGAL SOURCES, IDEOLOGY,
AND PROCESS
A. Legal Sources in European Private Law
It will be useful for the reader not familiar with the intricacies of EU
law to offer some context in which the current issues are unfolding. Unlike
the United States, the European Union did not create a system of federal
courts, thus what is largely understood as European private law results
from a complex interplay of harmonizing directives and national private
law regimes. The process of private law harmonization encompasses a
large number of legal sources and institutional actors both at the European
and at the national level.5
others have allied with the project of resisting the European Commission agenda
while coalescing around the Social Justice Manifesto. See, e.g., Ugo Mattei, The Rise
and Fall of Law and Economics: An Essay for Judge Guido Calabresi, 64 MD. L.
REV. 220, 239 (2005); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of
Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 640 (1995).
5. Sources of law also known in comparative law as legal formants primarily refer to a
legislative, judicial, and scholarly source. See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A
Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (pt. I), 39 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1 (1991);
RODOLFO SACCO & SILVIA FERRER], INTRODUZIONE AL Dtrrro COMPARATO (1980);
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European private law comprises a variety of legal rules, which derive
from legislative, judicial, and scholarly sources operating at different levels
of government.6 The legislative source of European private law comprises
both the body of EU legislation, namely directives that created a patchwork
harmonization of private law rules, and national legal rules enshrined in
continental Civil Codes, "which in some cases are naturally converging. '7
Finally, European private law also encompasses those legal provisions that
transpose European directives that Member States introduced into their
existing civil codes. European lawyers therefore, have plunged into this
complicated scenario, in which European legal traditions encounter
different legal sources as well as different levels of governments.8 This
Article predominantly focuses on the legislative source, namely a number
of directives that the European Commission has proposed to harmonize the
field of European private law.9 The Community institutions include the
European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European
Parliament. The Commission acts both as a legislative and as an executive
branch and is composed by twenty-five commissioners who are appointed
for five years with the power to initiate legislative processes.' 0 The Council
of Ministers is composed of representatives from a ministerial level of the
twenty-five Member States, who can commit their government to
Community policies." The European Parliament (EP) is composed of 732
members, who are directly elected by European citizens for five-year
terms. 12 Together, the Council and the EP perform as a two-house
legislature adopting Community acts, which can be either regulations or
directives. While regulations have general application, are binding in their
entirety, and are directly applicable in all Member States, directives need to
Rodolfo Sacco, Souvenirs d'un vieux comparatiste, 10 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
EuROPpISCHES PRIVATRECHT [Z. Eu. P.] 727 (2002) (F.R.G.).
6. See P.G. Monateri & Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 531, 531-32 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
7. See Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, Editorial, 13 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 281, 281-83 (2005)
(discussing the late payment directive and its implementation).
8. See generally Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in
the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671 (2002) (identifying
various sources of law and the problems associated with lack of unity).
9. In particular we will use as an example, a well-known Directive in European contract
law: Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29-34 (EEC) [hereinafter Unfair
Terms Directive].
10. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 211, 1997 O.J.
(C 340) 3 [hereinafter EC Treaty] (defining the power of the Commission); see also
PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BOIRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 59 (3d
ed. 2003).
11. See EC Treaty art. 203; see also CRAIG & DE B-RCA, supra note 10, at 65.
12. EC Treaty art. 190.
2006]
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be transposed into Member States' legal orders to become fully binding.
13
Even though Member States are obliged to attain the goal set by the
directive or "the result to be achieved," they maintain discretion over
implementing measures.14
Under Articles 94 and 95 EC, which indicate that the goal of
harmonization is the establishment and functioning of the internal market,
the Community enjoys a relatively broad power to issue directives to
harmonize specific private law rules.' 5 The main difference between these
provisions is that under Article 94 EC the Council decides by unanimity
after consulting the EP, whereas under Article 95 EC the Council decides
by majority voting through the co-decision procedure, whereby the EP has
a co-equal role. 16 First introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, today the co-
decision procedure or "Community Method" has become the basic
Community legislative process. 17 Under Article 251 EC, the co-decision
procedure proceeds as follows: the Commission drafts a text, and then the
Council and the EP can amend and approve the text through the adoption of
a common position or the intervention of a conciliation committee.
Following the approval of a directive, Member States must transpose it into
their national legal systems.
In the mid-1980s, the Commission began the harmonization of private
law in the realm of consumer contracts for door-to-door sales and product
13. See id. art. 249.
14. See id Directives are distinct from classic federal legislation in that Member States
can choose with some flexibility, which type of national instrument to implement in
order to achieve the prescribed goal. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 10, at 114-
15.
15. The term "harmonization," or approximation of the laws, was introduced in the
original Treaty of Rome (1958) under Article 100 (now article 94 EC) with the goal
of eliminating the distortions of competition created by the laws of the Member
States. The Single European Act (1987) adopted Article 100A (now article 95 EC),
which required majority voting rather than unanimity to achieve the approximation of
national measures for the establishment and functioning of the common market. In
contrast, moreover, under Article 95 EC the Council decides via majority voting
through a co-decision procedure, as set out in Article 251 EC in which Council and
EP share equal powers, which approximation measures will be adopted, where Article
94 EC requires unanimity. See Walter van Gerven, Harmonization of Private Law:
Do We Need It?, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 505, 505-06 (2004).
16. The co-decision procedure is laid down in EC Treaty art. 251.
17. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 10, at 144-47 (explaining the co-decisional
procedure); Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New
Approaches to Governance in the European Union, 8 EuR. L.J. 1 (2002) (using the




liability rules. 18 By the end of the 1980s, numerous consumer contract
directives created a body of European private law tackling consumer
policy, which was only expressly included under the competence of the
Community by the Maastricht Treaty (1992).1 9 Even though these
directives regulated consumer issues, their main goal was the establishment
and functioning of the internal market, based on Article 95 EC, rather than
the creation of a body of European consumer policy under Article 153
EC. 20
The legal scholarship source of European private law comprises
publications, casebooks, or doctrinal commentaries addressing European
contract and tort law. 21 These materials enable scholars to expose the views
of "la doctrine" to influence both national and European educational legal
systems. In order to obtain greater convergence of European legal
education to achieve a European common law, academics advocate for a
greater role of scholarship in channelling the harmonization process. The
focus of this Article is primarily on this source and what we will define as
the scholarship industry promoted by European lawyers.
Finally, the judicial source in European private law includes the
domestic courts' jurisprudence, which interprets European directives and
the growing body of jurisprudence from the European Court of Justice
18. See the Council Directive 85/577, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 31-33 (EEC) that protects the
consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises.
19. See EC Treaty art. 153. See generally STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EC CONSUMER LAW
AND POLICY (John A. Usher ed., Eur. Law Series 1997) (describing how EC consumer
policy constructed its identity in the shadow of fundamental constitutional omissions
from the original treaty); Geraint G. Howells, "Soft Law" in EC Consumer Law, in
LAWMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 310 (Paul Craig & Carol Harlow eds., 1998)
(discussing the role of "soft law" to fill gaps in formal laws).
20. From 1985 to 1999 the Commission agenda triggered seven Directives on European
contract law. See Commission Green Paper on European Union Consumer
Protection, at 3-4 COM (2001) 531 final (Oct. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Consumer
Protection Paper]. The most recent European legislation in contract law is the
Directive on Consumer Sales and Associated Guarantees. See Council Directive
1999/44, 1999 O.J. (L 171) 12. In the Consumer Protection Paper, the EC noted its
intent to harmonize the disparate existing laws of the Member States to ease burdens
on businesses while protecting consumers in an effort to improve the functionality of
the internal consumer market. See Consumer Protection Paper, supra at section 3.
21. See PHILLIPPE JESTAZ & CHRISTOPHE JAM[N, LA DOCTRINE (2004).
22. See Walter van Gerven, Codifying European Private Law? Yes, if... !, 27 EUR. L.
REv. 156 (2002); Walter van Gerven, Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other
at the European Level, CCLE (Leuven Centre for a Common Law of Europe,
Florence), Dec. 2005, http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/ccle/publications.php (follow
"W. van Gerven, Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other at the European
Level" hyperlink under "Other CCLE Related Publications").
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("ECJ"). The case law of the ECJ raises tension. This tension is well known
in the United States in the domain of the general federal common law,23
and this tension concerns the role of the ECJ in the interpretation of private
law rules, traditionally interpreted by domestic courts.24
The ECJ can only interpret directives via two procedural grounds.
The first concerns a suit brought before the ECJ by the Commission under
Article 226 EC. The Commission polices Member States for their
incorrect or late implementation of directives and has the discretion to sue
those governments that are reluctant to follow its recommendations on the
6426edr rassnmru"correct" transposition of directives. This procedure raises numerous
problems on what should be the correct transposition of directives by those
Member States with profoundly diverse legal systems and national legal
traditions. 7
The second procedural ground allows individuals to bring actions
before their national courts raising preliminary questions on the
interpretation of EC law. By means of the procedure of Article 234 EC,
national judges have the discretion to refer such questions to the ECJ for
preliminary rulings.28 This instrument has been fundamental to the effective
23. In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the U.S. Supreme Court overturned
Swift v. Tyson, 16 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) by rejecting the existence of a "federal
general common law." Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
24. See Peter Rott, What is the Role of the ECJ in EC Private Law? - A Comment on the
ECJ Judgments in Ocdano Grupo, Freiburger Kommunalbauten, Leitner and
Veedfald, I HANSE L. REv. 6, 6-7 (2005).
25. See EC Treaty art. 226.
26. See Case C-52/00, Comm'n v. France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-3827.
27. See Case C-478/99, Comm'n v. Sweden, 2000 E.C.R. 1-04147.
28. See EC Treaty art. 234.
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community
and of the ECB;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question
is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give
a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal
of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under
national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of
SOCIAL JUSTICE
enforcement of the new rights and remedies granted by EC law directly to
individuals and to groups. 29 Domestic courts have largely contributed to the
expansion and application of EC law, even though their behavior varies
significantly in each Member State. Jurists pointed out that within the same
legal system, legal elites, who were initially reluctant to refer preliminary
questions to the ECJ, later began to deploy preliminary rulings as a means
for their judicial empowerment.3 °
Scholars wrote extensively on the uniqueness of this judicial
exchange between domestic and European courts, depicting it as a
constitutional and participatory dialogue between national and
supranational judges. Some jurists stressed how the constitutionalization of
EC law has progressively empowered national courts as the "agents of the
Community order" vis a vis Member States. 31 In contrast, others
highlighted that such processes vary greatly depending on the attitude of
national judges in sheepishly adopting or resisting EC law and its
interpretation by the ECJ.1
2
In this vein, by shifting their attention from European integration
towards the behavior of domestic courts and national interest groups,
commentators are increasingly focusing on the preliminary reference
mechanism as a unique standpoint to understand the judicial dialogue and
cooperation in the EU.33 Finally, Micklitz has openly addressed the
problem of political legitimacy in conjunction with patterns of judicial
cooperation in different legal fields. He has highlighted that any inquiry of
judicial cooperation in the EU needs to take into account the "preparedness
of the national courts to use preliminary reference procedure" as well as
Justice.
Id.
29. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 10, at 528 (discussing the legality of community
measures); id. at 178-229 (explaining the EC doctrine of direct effect); id. at 397-431
(discussing the EC doctrine of state liability).
30. See P.P. Craig, Report on the United Kingdom, in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND
NATIONAL COURTS-DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL
CONTEXT 195, 220-21 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1998).
31. Id; Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Dialogues in the European Community, EUI
WORKING PAPERS (European Univ. Inst., Florence), Dec. 1995, at 1, 22-26.
32. See LISA CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
74 (2002); Leone Niglia, The Non-Europeanization of Private Law, 9 EUR. REV.
PRIVATE L. 575 (2001).
33. See Paul Davies, Transfers of Undertakings, in LABOUR LAW IN THE COURTS:
NATIONAL JUDGES AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 131, 131-228 (Silvana
Sciarra ed., 2001); Claire Kirkpatrick, Gender Equality: A Fundamental Dialogue, in
LABOUR LAW IN THE COURTS: NATIONAL JUDGES AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE, supra, at 31, 41-130.
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"the way in which courts react to ECJ judgments."
34
B. Technocracy at Work: What Is the Common Frame of
Reference?
Today, anybody pursuing the task of reading the numerous articles on
European private law will encounter the notion of a "Common Frame of
Reference" (CFR), which was created by the European Commission in its
attempt to further harmonization, while at the same time using a tool,
which would be perceived by the Member States as a less top-down form
of regulation.
The Commission as a hybrid is the EC executive branch but it also
retains the power of initiative over Community legislation. In setting its EC
legislative agenda, the Commission's committees are continuously
consulting the Council, the EP, and other supranational bodies to determine
the course of future legislative activities.3 However, in response to the
increasing democratic concerns raised by policy-makers and academics on
the Community method, in 2001 the Commission launched an extensively
advertised survey of the stakeholders who are likely to be affected by EC
regulations. The Commission aimed at improving the quality and the
effectiveness of Community re-regulation, while at the same time
promoting soft law and new forms of governance to complement the
Community method.36 In the realm of European contract law the
Commission consulted stakeholders and academics on whether to continue
with a sectoral intervention, namely via sectoral directives and soft law
instruments, or rather adopt a more comprehensive and "hard" European
Civil Code.3 7
In February 2003, the European Commission published an Action
Plan aimed at achieving greater coherence in European contract law.3 8 The
Action Plan continues the ongoing debate with stakeholders and academics
launched in 2001 to foster dialogue on the practical as well as technical
34. See HANS-W. MICKLITZ, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL CO-OPERATION IN THE EU:
SUNDAY TRADING, EQUAL TREATMENT AND GOOD FAITH 27 (2005).
35. See Christian Joerges, "Good Governance" Through Comitology?, in EU
COMMITTEES" SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW AND POLITICS 311, 318 (Christian Joerges &
Ellen Vos eds., 1999).
36. See LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Grdinne de Bfirca & Joanne
Scott eds., 2006).
37. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on European Contract Law, at 6-7, COM (2001) 398 final (Nov. 7, 2001)
[hereinafter Green Paper].
38. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council -
A More Coherent European Contract Law - An Action Plan, COM (2003) 68 final
(Dec. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Action Plan].
[Vol. 41: 1
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problems arising from the divergence of national contract law regimes. 39 By
targeting the obstacles, which prevent the smooth functioning of the
internal market, the Action Plan aspired to improve the quality of
Community regulation through legislative transparency and stakeholders'
participation.
In the Action Plan, the Commission was careful to take further action
in the field of contract law but uncertain on the tools such as hard and soft,
sectoral or comprehensive measures to achieve an efficient and coherent
regulation of contract law. In departing from a European codification, the
Action Plan chooses to ameliorate the existent contract acquis
communautaire,40 by improving its coherence through both hard measures
and soft ones, 41 in particular through a non-binding Common Frame of
Reference ("CFR").4 By this point it was already abundantly clear that the
harmonization of contract law was the minimalist approach that the
Commission could reach more easily and with less opposition than
39. See id. at 4; Dirk Staudenmayer, The Commission Action Plan on European Contract
Law, 11 EuR. REV. PRIVATE L. 113, 113-27 (2003).
40. The acquis communautaire is the result of the body of Directives, mostly
harmonizing consumer contracts and product liability and their common
interpretation, by the ECJ that constitutes the core of European private law. See
Reiner Schulze, The Acquis Communautaire and the Development of European
Contract Law, in INFORMATIONSPFLICHTEN UND VERTRAGSSCHLUSS iM ACQUIS
COMMUNAUTAIRE: INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS AND FORMATION OF CONTRACT IN
THE ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE 15 (Reiner Schulze et al. eds., 2003) (explaining the
development of a European contract acquis).
41. In the field of European private law, the Commission has used legislation adopted
through the Community method or "hard law" to harmonize European private law.
These hard measures (directives, regulations) are enforced by national and European
courts and they are mandatory as well as binding tools of regulation. However, in
response to the increasing democratic concerns regarding the Community method, in
2001 the Commission launched an extensive inquiry to improve the quality and the
effectiveness of Community re-regulation and at the same time promote soft law and
new forms of governance to complement the Community method. Soft law measures
are not fully binding, they are voluntary and they can, according to some scholars,
achieve better goals by departing from a command and control strategy. See Grdinne
de Bfirca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and
Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 36, at 2-4; David M.
Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social
Europe: The Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination, 11 EuR. L.J. 343 (2005).
42. See Action Plan, supra note 38, paras. 75-77 (addressing consolidation, codification
and the existing instruments as possible means to achieve greater coherence).
"Codification means the adoption of a new legal instrument which brings together in
a single text, but without changing the substance, a previous instrument and its
successive amendments, with the new instrument replacing the old one and repealing
it." Id. at 20 n.56 (emphasis added).
2006]
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undertaking fields such as property or family law.43
Similar to the United States Restatement of Contracts, the CFR aims
to increase the coherence of the contract law acquis and to achieve the
uniform application of directives. But the language of the Commission
carefully avoids the term "code" while adopting the softer notion of CFR.
This still obscure tool should provide common principles, terminology, and
rules for contract law to address gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities emerging
from the application of European contract law. 4
According to the Commission, the non-uniform implementation of
directives by Member States leads to inconsistencies and fragmentation of
contract regimes, creating different legal rules for the same commercial
situation.45 The Commission maintains that a non-uniform application of
contract rules entails high transaction costs, burdening both industries and
"active" consumers in search of precious information.46 High transaction
costs emerge not only in the phase of formation of cross-border contracts,
but also through judicial control over the fairness of contractual terms. 4 7 In
order to achieve greater coherence in the application of European contract
law and consequently reduce transaction costs, the Commission's strictly
functionalist approach is to improve the quality of the existing acquis
communautaire. In short, the Action Plan reinforces the view that the
existence of different contract law regimes creates a barrier to trade for
cross-border transactions within the internal market, thus coherence means
more efficient outcomes, which can be reached through better uniformity in
implementation and maximal harmonization.48
43. See generally Daniela Caruso, Private Law and Public Stakes in European
Integration: The Case of Property, 10 EUR. L.J. 751 (2004) (discussing European
property law); Maria Rosaria Marella, The Non-Subversive Function of European
Private Law: The Case of Harmonisation of Family Law, 12 EuR. L.J. 78 (2006)
(discussing European family law).
44. See Action Plan, supra note 38, Executive Summary, at 2 ("[T]he Commission will
seek to increase, where necessary and possible, coherence between instruments,
which are part of the EC contract law acquis, both in their drafting and in their
implementation and application. Proposals will, where appropriate, take into account
a common frame of reference, which the Commission intends to elaborate via
research and with the help of all interested parties. This common frame of reference
should provide for best solutions in terms of common terminology and rules ... ").
45. See id. paras. 16-24, 57; Rodolfo Sacco, Langues et droit, in LES MUTIPLES LANGUES
Du DROIT EUROPEEN UN1FORME 163, 163-85 (Rodolfo Sacco & Luca Castellani eds.,
1999).
46. See Action Plan, supra note 38, paras. 25-5 1.
47. Id. paras. 34-39. For example, more information is necessary for different national
mandatory rules limiting or excluding contractual liability. See id.
48. Id. para. 57. "An improved EC acquis should enhance the uniform application of
Community law as well as facilitate the smooth functioning of cross-border
[Vol. 41: 1
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In response to the Action Plan, the European Parliament, traditionally
proactive in matters of private law codification and having endorsed this
idea since the late 1980s, also recognized the need for further
harmonization in order to facilitate cross-border transactions within the
internal market. 49 Even though the European Parliament offered its political
guidance to drive further Europeanization of contract law, it warned the
Commission not to overstep the boundaries of Community competences.50
Article 5 EC, stating the principle of attributed competences of the
Community, is the major concern of supranational institutions. In response,
the Commission increasingly argued that via greater coherence in the
acquis, through maximal harmonization and less differentiation, European
contract law would serve the goal of eliminating obstacles to integration,
rather than creating new ones.
In drafting the Action Plan the Commission technocrats emphasized
that the CFR would eliminate market inefficiencies arising from the diverse
implementation of European directives, ensuring greater coherence in their
interpretation by courts. According to the Commission, the CFR should
provide jurists with a solution to the costly problem of the non-uniform
interpretation of European contract law due to vague terms and rules.51 In
2004, the Commission was confident that the CFR would improve the
coherence of the existing and future acquis.
52
According to one of the Commission's follow-ups to the Action Plan,
inconsistencies in European contract law are triggered by vague legal
transactions and, thereby, the completion of the internal market." Id.
49. See Report on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council-A More Coherent European Contract Law-an Action Plan, EUR.
PARL. DoG. (COM A5-0256/2003) (2003), prepared by Klaus-Heiner Lehne. Here the
EP argues that new harmonizing directives on contract law should be based on EC
Treaty art. 95 and, in the aftermath of the tobacco advertising judgement, it should
have as a primary goal the achievement and functioning of the internal market. Id.
50. See Staudenmayer, supra note 39, at 116-17.
51. See Action Plan, supra note 38, para. 18.
52. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council - European Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis: The Way Forward,
§ 1, COM (2004) 651 final (Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter The Way Forward].
[T]he Commission will use the CFR as a toolbox, where appropriate, when
presenting proposals to improve the quality and coherence of the existing
acquis and future legal instruments in the area of contract law. At the same
time, it will serve the purpose of simplifying the acquis. The CFR will
provide clear definitions of legal terms, fundamental principles and coherent
model rules of contract law, drawing on the EC acquis and on best solutions
found in Member States' legal orders.
Id. § 2.1.1 (internal citations omitted).
2006]
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
concepts introduced by the directives. 53 In particular, two types of problems
arise when the directives contain vague terminology. First, directives adopt
"broadly defined" legal concepts, therefore leaving too much discretion in
their implementation to national legislators or judges.5 4 Second, directives
introduce legal concepts that are "alien to the existing national legislation,"
thus providing puzzlement and leeway for new statutory interpretations by
courts.55 Thus, when judges face vague terms, they can either interpret them
by referring to the broad principles of the acquis communautaire, or they
can refer to the particular goals of the directive in question. While the latter
interpretation is problematic because it leads to high "fragmentation of
national legislation," according to the Commission the former
interpretation will promote greater coherence in European contract law.56
As an example, the Commission openly referred to the Leitner
judgement as a problematic case because the ECJ followed the substance
but not the formal reasoning deployed by Advocate General ("A.G.")
Tizzano in interpreting the notion of damage enshrined in Article 4 of the
Directive. The A.G. suggested that the notion of damage should be
interpreted in light of the acquis communautaire by referring to other
European directives and precedents, whereas the ECJ decided to interpret
the notion of damage in connection with the limited purpose of the Package
Holiday Directive.57 In doing so, the Court was not constrained from the
acquis communautaire, but it interpreted the notion of damage in light of
the particular circumstances of the case. The concern raised by the
Commission was that the wide interpretive discretion of the ECJ might
conflict with the goal of the Community decision maker in regulating the
single market, thus undermining the legitimacy of EU law.
Recently the Commission has openly selected two legal instruments
to achieve greater coherence in European contract law. In October 2004,
the Commission committed to a maximal level of harmonization as a
53. Id. § 2.1.1 (summarizing the four problems addressed by the action plan: (1) the use
of abstract terms; (2) application of directives; (3) differences between national
implementing laws; and, (4) inconsistencies in EC contract law legislation).
54. Action Plan, supra note 38, para. 19; see Council Directive 90/314, Package Travel
Directive, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 59-64 (EEC). This was the option taken by Advocate
General Tizzano in Leitner but the court did not follow suit. In that case, the court
preferred to interpret the notion of damage in light of a mere textualist reading of the
Package Travel Directive. See Case C-168/00, Simone Leitner v. TUI Deutschland
GmbH & Co. KG, 2002 E.C.R. 1-2631.
55. Action Plan, supra note 38, paras. 17-21 (addressing the ECJ judgments Travel- Vac
and Leitner).
56. Id. para. 21.




means to avoid fragmentation and incoherencies triggered by minimum
harmonization rule making in the implementation of directives. Moreover,
the CFR aims to provide both European and national judges with uniform
principles for interpreting European contract law, as a remedy to the
diverse interpretation by domestic courts.58 The institutionalization of the
CFR is developing day by day and it can be monitored on the Commission
website where the names of the new appointees from the Member States
are now made public.59
The CFR project has divided scholars into two opposite camps
supporting and opposing the Commission's agenda. On the Commission
side, Christian Von Bar maintained that the CFR is an important tool for
establishing coherence of European contract law.60 Likewise, the Acquis
Group claimed that its ability to provide a common terminology as well as
common principles to interpret the body of contract rules would be key to
fostering coherency in European contract law. 61 In going beyond a mere
functional approach, for which the CFR is simply an instrument to achieve
better legislation for the internal market, the Acquis Group suggested that
this tool could be used also by accession countries as a guideline for
implementing European law or by practitioners in interpreting directives
and then transposing national provisions.62
In contrast, jurists committed to the understanding of the practice of
58. See The Way Forward, supra note 52, § 3.1.3.
The structure envisaged for the CFR ... is that it would first set out common
fundamental principles of contract law, including guidance on when
exceptions to such fundamental principles could be required. Secondly, those
fundamental principles would be supported by definitions of key concepts.
Thirdly, these principles and definitions would be completed by model rules,
forming the bulk of the CFR.
Id.
59. See Europa, European Commission, Consumer Affairs, Common Frame of Reference,
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consint/safeshop/fairbus_pract/contlaw/common_
frame ref en.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2006) (providing a database of member state
experts).
60. See Christian Von Bar & Stephen Swann, A Response to the Action Plan on European
Contract Law: A More Coherent European Contract Law (COM (2003) 63), 11 EUR.
REV. PRIVATE L., 595, 597 (2003); Christian Von Bar, From Principles to
Codification: Prospects for European Private Law, 8 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 379, 385
(Stephen Swann trans., 2002).
61. See Gianmaria Ajani & Hans Schulte-N6lke, The Action Plan on a More Coherent
European Contract Law: Response on Behalf of the Acquis Group, para. 6, AcQuis
GROUP, May 15, 2003, http://www.acquis-group.org (follow "documents" hyperlink;





contract law and its social implications harshly criticized the CFR.63 They
claimed that the CFR is a formalist, technocratic, and exegetic enterprise
launched by the Commission in order to limit the social function of
contract law spurring from different national legal traditions. By dismissing
the social practices embedded in domestic legal regimes, the CFR could
end up reinforcing divergences instead of creating greater uniformity in
European contract law. In their view, the CFR promotes a uniform
application of European contract law, opening the risk of even further
technocratic integration.64
C. The Ideological Divide: Neo-liberalism Versus Social Justice in
European Contract Law
The scholarly debate on the CFR reflects the current division in
European private law scholarship, a division that we can roughly
summarize as follows. Currently one of the most important cleavages lies
between neo-liberal jurists championing for contractual freedom against
social justice advocates arguing for welfarist rules within European
contract law. This section underlines not only these political divisions, but
it also shows how legal forms within this debate play an ambiguous role.
Social justice advocates are sometimes committed to soft-law tools and
other times champion hard-law approaches. 65 Similarly, neo-liberal lawyers
at times advocate for uniform standards and more often for soft legal tools.
The European Unfair Terms Directive adopted by the European Council in
199366 provides one example of the ideological divide that pervades the
way jurists have been analyzing these contradictions.
Neo-liberal jurists have claimed that European contract law was a
"constitutive element" of the internal market, one that enhanced its
functioning mechanisms by designating the rules of the game. The
harmonization of contract law contributed to strengthening the single
market by ensuring a level playing field that enhanced individual freedoms.
In supporting the harmonizing agenda of the Principles of Contract Law,67
these jurists emphasized that the harmonization of contract law could
provide greater information to private actors and enhance their private
63. See Social Justice Manifesto, supra note 2, at 662-64.
64. Id; Hugh Collins, Editorial: The Future of European Private Law: An Introduction,
10 EuR. L.J. 649, 649-52 (2004).
65. See supra note 41.
66. See Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 9.
67. See COMM'N ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT
LAW: PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000); MARTUN W. HESSELINK,
THE NEW EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE LAW IN
EUROPE 112-13 (Private Law in European Context Series, 2002).
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autonomy.68 In supporting the idea of a European economic constitution,
they argued in favor of a European codification, which guaranteed to each
person the disposition of her individual entitlements. Jtirgen Basedow
maintained that the notion of freedom of contract remained the core idea
for a European codification since every individual has the right to affirm
his or her will to enter into a binding contract. In his view, European
codification strengthened economic freedoms and counterbalanced the
growing importance of consumer regulation that undermined those
common values enshrined in the notion of contractual freedom. 69 For these
lawyers, the scope of market harmonization was to remedy the market
failure created by the cleavage between commercial and non-commercial
contractual regimes, which restricted market competition and created
informational asymmetry. 70 These lawyers have tied claims for European
codification 71 to a notion of contract law as a tool for enhancing party
autonomy across Member States.72
These neo-liberal lawyers have devoted great attention to and
supported legislative measures proposed by the Commission. However,
they have highlighted that Community action should be cautious not to
undermine its democratic legitimacy, which is guaranteed by European
procedures and mostly by national democratic processes.7 3 For instance, the
68. See PARTY AUTONOMY AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET
(Stefan Grundmann et al. eds., 2001).
69. See Jidrgen Basedow, Codification of Private Law in the European Union: The
Making of a Hybrid, 9 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 35, 35-49 (2001). The freedom to bind
oneself contractually to a future disposition is an important and striking example of
this freedom. See id. at 42. The role of contract law "is based upon the theoretical
perception that promise and the reliance on it is a basic behaviour in human society."
Id. at 38.
70. See Stefan Grundmann, The Structure of European Contract Law, 9 EUR. REV.
PRIVATE L. 505, 518 (2001).
71. See EIirgen Basedow, A Common Contract Law for the Common Market, 33 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 1169, 1173-82 (1996).
72. See AN ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (Stefan Grundmann
& Jules Stuyck eds., 2002).
73. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12,
1993, 89 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 197 (F.R.G.),
translated in [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57 ("Maastricht Decision"); cf Joseph H.H. Weiler,
The State "fiber alles": Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision (Jean
Monnet Ctr. for Int'l & Regional Econ. Law & Just., N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Working
Paper No. 6/95, 1995), available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/
papers95.html (follow "No. 6/95" hyperlink) (decrying perceived Nazi-Era notions of
racial and ethnic homogeneity required for democratic legitimacy reflected in the
Maastricht Decision); Peter Lindseth, The Maastricht Decision Ten Years Later:
Parliamentary Democracy, Separation of Powers, and the Schmittian Interpretation
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Community cannot take away individual rights from European citizens that
the Treaty has conferred upon them. 74 In casting light on the procedural
guarantees of EC law, they advocated for a European codification in tune
with the functioning of the single market and for legislative discretion by
supranational institutions. These jurists often share a common intellectual
tradition, which can be traced back to the Freiburg ordo-liberal school,
which goes also under the rubric of German neo-liberalism,75 founded in
the 1930s. In drawing on the ordo-liberal intellectual tradition, they traced
back the meaning of notions such as contractual freedom to the post WWII
economic compromise of the German social-market economy. The ordo-
liberal tradition offered to the integration project an influential model of
legitimation through the notion of the "economic constitution., 76 In relying
on the central tenets of the ordo-liberal tradition, jurists perceive the
European economic constitution enshrined in the Treaty as a means to
ensure greater individual autonomy within the internal market. In arguing
in favor of a European codification, they are attempting to provide a
framework of general contract rules that will ensure equal possibilities to
all players in a free market and create a system of undistorted
competition.77
In the late 1980s the Commission was in search of a model for
drafting the future Unfair Terms Directive.78 The Commission relied to a
great extent on the German law regulating unfair contract terms. The
AGBG 79  (Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen
Reconsidered 8-17 (Eur. Univ. Inst., Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies,
Working Paper No. 2003/18, 2003), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students
/orgs/hela/papers/peterlindseth.pdf (arguing that the Maastricht Decision was
informed not by racial and ethnic concerns but by the German experience at the
national level that a lack of clearly defined legislative delegation will result in the
usurpation of democratic legitimacy by the executive).
74. See Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker, On the Legitimacy of European Law, 58 RABELS
ZEITSCHRIFT 615, 615-35 (1994).
75. See VIKTOR J. VANBERG, THE CONSTITUTION OF MARKETS: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL
ECONOMY 37 (2001).
76. See MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL READING OF ARTICLE 30
OF THE EC TREATY 126-27 (1998).
77. See Christian Joerges, What is Left of the European Economic Constitution? 12, 13
(Eur. Univ. Inst., Working Paper No. 2004/13, 2004), available at http://www.iue.it/
PUB/law04-13.pdf, see also KERRY RITTICH, RECHARACTERIZING RESTRUCTURING:
LAW, DISTRIBUTION AND GENDER IN MARKET REFORM 112 (2002); David J. Gerber,
Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the
"New" Europe, 42 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 25, 25-26 (1994).
78. See Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 9.
79. Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen [Standard
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Geschdftsbedingungen) (Standard Contract Terms Statute of 1976) was
adopted in 1976 by the Federal German Republic to regulate standard
forms agreements. The AGBG aimed to achieve a fair balance between
conflicting interests in order to provide a level playing field for private
actors and reinvigorate the principle of freedom of contract. 80 The AGBG
already contained all those rules that characterize the Unfair Terms
Directive adopted in 1993, such as the principle of good faith and the
blacklist of unfair clauses. Most interestingly, it included a preliminary
exception that excluded the application of both provisions when there was
an individual agreement over a contract. The AGBG was adopted as a
provision intended to regulate economic transactions between industry and
consumers and aimed at giving greater certainty to a consistent body of
jurisprudence. German scholars had long advocated for policing the
imbalances and inequalities in adhesion contracts. In particular, the AGBG
was associated with Ludwig Raiser, one of the prominent private lawyers
in post-WWII Germany. Raiser was committed to the creation of a liberal
constitutional paradigm reconstructing the relation between the law,
societal values, and the economy.
81
However, the Unfair Terms Directive triggered a lot of discontent for
a number of reasons. Those neo-liberal jurists who were no longer
committed to harmonization per se, but began adopting a "Law and
Economics" approach to contract rules while appreciating the competitive
advantages in soft legal regime, claimed that by policing the unfairness of
contracts, the Directive had been "abused" because it created more
stringent provisions than the ones contained in the German AGB-Gesetz.
They argued that courts have gained disproportionate power through the
blacklist of unfair terms adopted by the Directive since they can void those
contract terms they consider unfair. As Roberto Pardolesi highlighted, from
an economic perspective, the paradox is that in declaring the terms void,
judges cannot consider the price of the contract or of the term since this is
82
expressly left out from the realm of the Directive. In adopting United
States mainstream "Law and Economics" insights, neo-liberal jurists
attacked welfare provisions contained in European directives.83 They
Contract Terms Statute], Dec. 9, 1976, BGBI. I at 3317, as amended (F.R.G.).
80. See LUDWIG RAISER, DAS RECHT DER ALLGEMEINEN GESCHAdFTSBENDINGUNGEN
(1935). For a comparative overview, see Umberto Morello, Condizioni Generali di
Contratto, in 3 DIGESTO DELLE DISCIPLINE PRIVATISTICHE: SEZIONE CIVILE 334, 334-
60 (1998).
81. See LUDWIG RAISER, IL COMPITO DEL DIRITTO PRIVATO [THE TASK OF THE PRIVATE
LAW] (Cosimo Marco Mazzoni ed., Marta Graziadei trans., 1990).
82. See Roberto Pardolesi, Clausole Abusive (nei contratti dei consumatori) Una
Direttiva Abusata?, 119, pt. 5 IL FORO ITALIANO 137, 150 (1994).
83. Compare DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 116 (1997) (defining
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deployed public choice rationales to undermine the goals of the Unfair
Terms Directive, which "may cause inefficiencies rather then curing
them., 84 In drawing on mainstream "Law and Economics" insights, they
argued that although the Directive aimed to protect consumers against
unfairness, in reality, it raised potential causes for inefficiencies, thus
creating negative welfare implications.
85
The Unfair Terms Directive also received sharp critiques from those
jurists advocating for a welfarist approach to private law and distributive
justice in contract law. These scholars argued that contract law should
abandon a procedural conception of justice and move towards a substantive
one. 86 If the notion of procedural justice entailed the protection of
individual rights and market efficiency, they favored a substantive notion
of justice in order to achieve an "acceptable pattern of welfare" with fair
distributive results. 87  Moreover their skepticism towards the EC
harmonization agenda contributed to their bias toward hard or uniform
legislative tools at the European level, while favoring soft and flexible tools
of regulation.
For instance, when analyzing the Unfair Terms Directive, social
justice advocates began challenging the harmonization of contract law as
widely driven by market rationality rather than consumer protection.
88
Their criticisms focused on the over-emphasis of the Directive on the
internal market as the primary reason for justifying the harmonization of
unfair contract terms. 89 For example, the preamble of the Directive
mainstream "Law and Economics" in the United States), with Roberto Pardolesi,
Economic Analysis of Contract Law: Some Insights, 1 CARDOzO ELECTRIC L. BULL.
17 (1995), http://www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/Review/Contract/Pardolesi-1995/pardo.
html (follow "adhesion contracts" hyperlink) (attacking the Unfair Contract Terms
Directive and its "shocking black list of standard forms whose common thread is to
shift risks from sellers to buyers").
84. See Roger Van den Bergh, Forced Harmonisation of Contract Law in Europe: Not To
Be Continued, in AN ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, supra
note 72, at 249, 261.
85. Peter van Wijck & Jules Theeuwes, Protection Against Unfair Contracts: An
Economic Analysis of European Contract Law, 9 EuR. J.L. ECON. 73 (2000).
86. See Hugh Collins, Distributive Justice Through Contracts, in 45 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 1992, pt. 2 at 49, 66-67 (R.W. Rideout & B.A. Hepple eds., 1992).
87. See Hugh Collins, Introduction: The Research Agenda of Implicit Dimensions of
Contract, in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT: DISCRETE, RELATIONAL AND
NETWORK CONTRACTS 1, 11 (2003).
88. See Hugh Collins, Good Faith in European Contract Law, 14 OxFORD J. LEGAL
STuD. 229, 234 (1994).
89. The Recitals in the Preamble of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive focus
predominantly on the need to develop the single market and establish harmonized
ground rules. See Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 9, paras. 1-3, 5-8. This was a
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highlighted that divergence among national consumer regulations would
create a risk of distorting competition. The justification for the Directive
was the need to enhance competition in products and services across
Member States, rather than the need to develop regulations that reflect
contractual realities. 90  Finally, the Directive did not touch upon
individually negotiated terms nor did it address provisions regarding the
contract price. 91
According to social justice advocates, the Community leit-motif in
drafting the Directive rested on a market efficiency rationale that aimed to
expand consumer choice. They pointed out that the Directive described
buyers shopping for their best contractual terms across Member States and
assumed that consumers would be better off through greater competition
among contractual terms. They remarked that the Commission assumed
consumers to be actively involved in gathering and using information to
make their decisions.92 The Directive enlisted contract law as a market-
perfecting device, through which properly informed consumers could
police unfair terms.93
When explaining the stakes of harmonization, jurists put forward
three different theses that share a skeptical view on the European
constitutional arrangement: national resistance, subsidiarity, and cultural
difference. The resistance thesis focuses on the reactions of national legal
regimes to the implementation of European directives.94 According to this
view, the problem of the harmonization of contract law related to the
implementation of directives in Member States' legal orders, often
manifests itself in national civil codes. The different outcomes of the
Italian, German, and French legal regimes in implementing the Unfair
way to justify the legal basis adopted by the Directive emanating from EC Treaty art.
95, the provision governing the harmonization of the internal market.
90. An analysis of the Preamble makes it clearly evident that the internal market is the
priority. See Collins, supra note 88, at 235 (highlighting the lack of emphasis in the
Preamble to the Directive on the actual consumer contracting process).
91. See Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 9, art. 4(2). "The fairness of the transaction in
the sense of the price paid for the goods or services should not be subjected to review
or control." Collins, supra note 88, at 238. In Hugh Collins's view, this obscure
provision of the Directive, by requiring clarity more than fairness, demonstrates how
EC contract law is intended for consumer choice and not for consumer rights. See
Collins, supra note 88, at 237-38.
92. See, e.g., GERAINT HOWELLS & THOMAS WILHELMSSON, EC CONSUMER LAW 306
(1997); WEATHERILL, supra note 19, at 76.
93. See Collins, supra note 88, at 237. As Collins puts it, there is the consumerist
movement that "has percolated into the organs of the EC." Id. at 236.
94. See Daniela Caruso, The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm
of European Legal Integration, 3 EUR. L.J. 3, 14-17 (1997).
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Terms Directive revealed not only the difficulty in harmonizing contract
rules but also how little national contract laws were harmonized in
practice. 95 Daniela Caruso claimed that the attempt of the Commission to
reform private law through directives has actually engaged state legislators
and national courts in resistance against the Europeanization process.
96
The subsidiarity thesis, based on the principle introduced by the
Maastricht Treaty,97 focuses on the social dimension of contract law as
being inherently national and therefore culturally diverse. Some jurists
claimed that contract law could not rely on abstract general principles that
Europeanization brings with it. 98 They argued that the Commission should
make greater use of the subsidiarity principle allowing Member States to
regulate their contract law regimes differently. 99 The subsidiarity thesis has
advanced the view that national contract law is shot-through with
distributive concerns, which are now threatened from above by European
market integration. According to this thesis, Europeanization is a formalist
process that is suppressing diversity as an obstacle to free trade while it
undermines the distributive capacity of national contract law. 1
00
Some jurists have advanced a third thesis based on the notion of
cultural difference. In highly valuing the cultural diversity among national
legal regimes, they demonstrated skepticism about the possibilities of the
harmonization process. Drawing on sociological, 01  cultural, 10 2 and
95. See id. at 24-25. Daniela Caruso shows how the Unfair Contract Terms Directive
struggled in its reception by national legal orders. The Product Liability Directive of
1985 was a similar big disappointment since Member States took enormous delays in
its implementation. Id at 15.
96. See id. at 4.
97. See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 333-34 (1994). This article
provides a procedural approach to determining issues of subsidiarity, rather than
substantive criteria to apply. The subsidiarity principle reads:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive Competence, the Community
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and
in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Id. at 346 (quoting EC Treaty art. 5).
98. See Hugh Collins, Transaction Costs and Subsidiarity in European Contract Law, in
AN ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 72, at 269,
280.
99. Id. at 278-80.
100. See Collins, supra note 88, at 232-33.
101. See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying
Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998).
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linguistic'0 3 insights, these scholars were skeptical of the unification of
private law regimes, which happened more at the level of declamations
than at the level of operative rules. In their view, the harmonization of
contract law erased European identities and offered a troubling
systematization of contract law without attempting to tackle the
fragmentation of legal contexts and the dilemmas of the welfare state.
10 4
Scholars adopting the cultural-difference thesis generally argued against
Europeanization as a formalist threat to preserving the cultural tradition
inherent in local or national contract law regimes. 10 5 In contrast to the
various soft approaches, a new slogan proposed in 2002 was "Hard Code
Now!" 106
D. The Social Justice Manifesto and the Legitimacy of the Process
In 2004, a number of jurists advocating for social justice in European
private law drafted a manifesto to address the concerns of citizens about a
European civil code "as an expression of cultural identity and a scheme of
social justice for a market order."' 07 In their intellectual enterprise, these
jurists embraced the idea that the new European legal culture offers a
possibility to escape from the formalism of private law regimes, allowing
for a more open and frank dialogue on the political and social stakes of the
Europeanization process.10 8 In sharing a realist understanding of contract
law, they drafted the Social Justice Manifesto to oppose the notion that
drafting a civil code should be a "technical problem to be overcome by
experts."'
09
Rather than a technocratic enterprise based on neutral principles, such
as freedom of contract, social justice advocates envisaged European
contract law as a set of doctrinal rules chosen to advance fairness and
102. See Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 52 (1996).
103. See generally LES MULTIPLES LANGUES DU DROIT, supra note 45 (collecting essays on
linguistic challenges in unification of law).
104. See Thomas Wilhelmsson, Introduction to FROM DISSONANCE TO SENSE: WELFARE
STATE EXPECTATIONS, PRIVATISATION AND PRIVATE LAW 3, 17-18 (Thomas
Wilhelmsson & Samuli Hurri eds., 1999).
105. Pierre Legrand, La Leqon d'Apollinaire, in L'HARMONIZATION DU DROIT DES
CONTRATS EN EUROPE 37 (Christophe Jamin & Denis Mazeaud eds., 2001).
106. See Ugo Mattei, Hard Code Now!, 2 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS No. 1, art. 1 (2002),
available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol2/iss1/art (asserting that a
European Code will benefit consumers, while soft-law measures would advance
corporate interests).
107. See Social Justice Manifesto, supra note 2, at 655.
108. See MARTIJN W. HESSELINK, THE NEW EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE 72-80 (2001).
109. Collins, supra note 64, at 649; see Social Justice Manifesto, supra note 2, at 655.
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distributive justice. 10 They emphasized that the harmonization of contract
law needs to be understood as part of European multi-level governance
creating political consequences for citizens of the Union rather than merely
a tool functional to the completion of the internal market. In opposing a
technocratic approach to harmonization, social justice advocates have
departed from those who suggest resisting harmonization of contract law
because the European level is pervaded by a free market bias, which
ultimately undermines national social welfare legislation. 1 I
Thus, social justice advocates claimed that the unification of private
law proceeds as part of the political evolution of the construction of the
European Union. Therefore, the Commission should address socio-
economic values more openly and democratically through "new methods
for the construction of this union of shared fundamental values (which
include respect for cultural diversity) as represented in the law of contract
and the remainder of private law." 112 Finally, in their plea for greater social
justice and regulatory legitimacy they maintain:
Unless a more democratic and accountable process is initiated,
there is a clear danger that these fundamental issues will never be
openly addressed, and a serious risk that powerful interest groups
will be able to manipulate the technocratic process behind the
scenes in order to secure their interests at the expense of the
welfare of ordinary citizens.
113
The Manifesto starts with the assumption that the Commission, in its
regulatory agenda, lacks a vision of fairness, because "[a]s traditionally
understood, the function of the European Community is to promote a free
market, not to ensure that this market is corrected in the light of distributive
aims."1 14 The three ideas around which the Manifesto unfolds are fairness
in contractual relations, the constitutionalization of private law, and the
legitimacy of European modes of governance. As to the notion of fairness
and the distributive effects of contract rules, the Manifesto suggests
following the examples of national private law systems, in which the
protection is based "upon social needs rather than equal opportunities, or a
concern about the distributive consequences of legal rules between groups,
such as creditors and debtors, and equally importantly, within such
groups."' 15
110. See HUGH COLLrNS, REGULATING CONTRACTs 356-61 (1999).




115. Id. at 666.
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While the neo-liberal agenda fosters clearly conservative goals, one
may also criticize the Social Justice Manifesto from the left. For instance,
the Manifesto emphasizes the need for procedural legitimacy-understood
as a more democratic and participatory process for European decision-
making-in the construction of European private law. While legitimacy is
certainly a necessary condition for reaching social justice through the law,
one might doubt that it is sufficient. A process can be politically legitimate
but can lead to anti-social outcomes should, for example, a conservative
ideological platform take over in the political process. Despite this
possibility, the political choice to intervene in the landscape of European
law with any reform proposal capable of handling (paradoxically even
choosing) the current neo-liberal drift is welcome as a frontal challenge to
the phenomenon of naturalization of the status quo, typical of the post-
modem condition.' 
16
The Manifesto, however, has only mildly challenged the most
influential part of the lawyer's profession, which has a stake in the current
equilibrium of power by controlling the lion's share of the European
funding to scholarly projects. Not surprisingly, a few months after the
publication of the Manifesto some of its authors have themselves obtained
rewarding sums from the Commission to carry on social justice work while
continuing to participate in the Study Group on a European Civil Code. 
17
This multiple role played by elite academics is indeed a recurrent pattern
within the social structure of European private law. As a consequence,
European private law scholarship is characterized by both the
fragmentation of scholarly groups and the formation of grand coalitions
pulled together for instrumental purposes, thus creating the phenomenon
that is called the Scholarly Industry.'
1 8
116. See KENNEDY, supra note 83, at 216, 236-38 (discussing the "naturalization effect" in
adjudication).
117. Headed by Christian Von Bar, this group, comprised of academics from the EU, has
undertaken the task of "produc[ing] a codified set of Principles of European Law for
the law of obligation and the law of property." Study Group on a European Civil
Code, http://www.sgecc.net/pages/en/home/index.welcome.htm (follow
"Introduction" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 4, 2006).
118. For a brilliant analysis on this subject by an anthropologist assessing the economic
and symbolic power of each group within the field of European private law, see
Agnes Schreiner, The Common Core of Trento, A Socio-legal Analysis of a Research
Project on European Private Law, in IN LAWYERS' CIRCLES: LAWYERS AND
EUROPEAN LEGAL INTEGRATION 125, 125-40 (Alex Jettinghoff & Harm Schepel eds.,
2004).
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E. The Scholarly Industry and Its Dark Sides
It is now worth devoting a few thoughts to European academic legal
scholarship, a very important component of the patchwork of European
private law in the making. As it is well known, legal scholarship has played
a pivotal role throughout the history of European private law, at least since
the renaissance of legal studies in Bologna early in the eleventh century.
Comparativists have observed that in the Western legal tradition academic
scholars thrive and blossom as hidden law givers' l9 particularly in times in
which the official authority of law is declining or where the law presents
itself as divided and in need of some rationalization. In the United States,
Justice Cardozo noticed a similar phenomenon when he observed in the
1920s that "the perplexity of the judge becomes the scholar's
opportunity.' 120 It is no surprise, therefore, that the highly complex
relationship between official producers of private law in present day
Europe would produce such an opportunity that some European academics
would quickly seize.
Elsewhere, we have described the variety of "professional projects"'
121
that might have motivated the academics that have taken a critical position
towards European codification, an issue that we do not wish to re-open
here. 122 We are now interested in moving a step forward by observing a
more pervasive phenomenon that can be better understood as the role of the
bourgeois European legal academia in the production of the ideological
component of a hegemonic project. Building on the work of Guy
Debord, 123 one can observe that in the production of the "spectacle" (or, if
we prefer, an aesthetic of European private law) determining the limits of
acceptable discourses, 124  both the authorities participating in its
construction and those that became authorities of its critique, play a similar
119. See Antonio Gambaro, II Successo del Giurista [The Jurist's Success], in 106 IL FORO
ITALIANO 86 (1983); see also JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 95-97
(spec. ed., Greenwood Press 1994) (1968).
120. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 6 (10th prtg., Yale University
Press 1954) (1924).
121. See MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1977).
122. See UGO MATTEI, THE EUROPEAN CODIFICATION PROCESS: CUT AND PASTE (2003).
123. See GuY DEBORD, SOCIETY OF THE SPECTACLE (Ken Knabb trans., Rebel Press 2005)
(1968).
124. See Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047 (2002).
For a more critical comment, but in a vein similar to that of this paper, see Heather
Hughes, Aesthetics of Commercial Law-Domestic and International Implications, 67
LA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript on file with authors).
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role. Consequently, what we are observing is independent from the euro-
friendly or euro-skeptical positions of the different legal scholars who are
active in the field. Both groups share a belief in the culturally legitimized
and thus respectable, and even desirable, nature of professionalized private
law, thus regarding the Western legal tradition as a cultural path and as a
domain of knowledge of which Europeans should be proud. If, to the
contrary, one observes for just a moment, European private law as a "social
practice" (or better as an aggregate of social practices) belonging to a
dominating social class and serving, by the building of an ideological
superstructure, the economic base of current (European) capitalism, the
attitude towards its desirability is bound to change. One then should see
European private law today (thus letting aside its more general historical
role in Western imperialism and plunder) largely as the product of an anti-
law movement, aimed at dismantling the concessions granted to
subordinate classes at the advantage of an outright return to a "far west" of
unregulated market behavior.
Such an anti-law movement is at play, produced by exactly the same
global actors, both in the United States and in Europe (and the other
periphery). Clearly its effectiveness in de-civilizing the law is in direct
proportion to the weakness of the formal and informal institutional
background in which it operates and the resistance that it is likely to find in
the institutional setting.125 In the United States, the anti-law movement is
busy, among many other things, preaching for lowered punitive damages
and the reduction of the role of the civil jury. It is also behind the
construction of the Law and Economics and Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) scholarly industries.
I26
The strategy, exposed by Laura Nader in her ground-breaking work
on "harmony ideology," works as follows: an idea, loaded with positive
meaning, is identified which may be a good cure for a social problem. We
do not need to spend time here on the issue of whether the "lack" that the
idea is attempting to cure is real or invented. 127 The example discussed by
Nader was that of ADR, but there are a variety of others, such as, for
example, the idea of "development," that of "international human rights,"
or that of "efficiency." Such ideas are usually broad, vague, and difficult to
challenge; who would argue against the fact that justice should be easily
125. In the sense used by DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
126. See LAURA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW (2002) (emphasizing the importance of the
civil litigant versus the power of the state and the corporation).
127. For example, the litigation explosion that originated the ADR frenzy in the United
States has been largely invented. See Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation
Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 7 (1986).
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available, that poor countries should be made better off, that human rights
should be respected, that it is better to organize something in an efficient
way, or, by the same token, that one should love his or her mother? Around
that idea, an intellectual movement of scholars producing work in the area
is identified by useful promoters of that idea as an ideology serving a
hegemonic project. Their work is consequently encouraged, promoted to
mainstream status by the usual patterns of academic prestige, and directly
or indirectly funded. Usually the phenomenon does not remain at the
academic level; rather, the scholarly work organized and institutionalized
as an industry gets used for a variety of policy functions. The industry thus
grows, develops its patterns of prestige and leadership, its canon, its
aesthetics, its foes, and its friends.
Nader has shown the phenomenon in the birth of the ADR industry,
promoted as a challenge to the civil rights movement in the late 1960s, and
now powerfully at play through the world. It is quite easy to see the birth
and flourishing of an International Human Rights industry, promoted and
organized by Western non-governmental organizations, highly instrumental
in the construction of non-Western inferiority and in the ethnocentric
promotion of Western values in such things as gender relationships or
family arrangements. Similarly, law and development, which started as an
industry during the Cold War, has declined but it is now back on its feet,
again playing a significant anti-law role in its contribution to the
Washington consensus version.
1 28
One of the authors of this Article has identified the development of an
"industry" in the transformations of the "Law and Economics" movement,
now pivotal in the policy-making of the international financial
institutions. 29 Some of its mainstream anti-law work, attempting to limit
the bite of punitive damages, is now financed openly and shamelessly by
gross polluters such as the Exxon Corporation. This scholarly industry,
extremely powerful and well-funded in the United States and abroad, de-
legitimizes the role of the law as a tool of control and constraint to free
market activity. Moreover, it aims to capture political and legislative
processes under the claim of neutral and efficient rules, improving wealth
128. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J.
FiN. 471 (1999).
129. See Ugo Mattei, The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics: An Essay for Judge Guido
Calabresi, 64 MD. L. REV. 220 (2005); see also JAY M. FEINMAN, UN-MAKNG
LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO ROLL BACK THE COMMON LAW 181-84
(2004).
130. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 748-52 (1996).
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maximization in market economies.'31
Once a scholarly industry is organized and promoted in the law, the
individual academic active in the field of inquiry occupied by the industry
is irresistibly attracted to it. Being internal to the industry offers career and
consulting opportunities for oneself and for his or her students, and even
the policy perspectives stemming from it are attractive for the true believers
and insiders. These academics in the scholarly industry thus develop
loyalties and in little time their radical critiques and exposing modes are
marginalized and silenced. True, bourgeois academic industries pride
themselves on being open and pluralistic. Scholars are not censored. Rather
they tend to self-censor. The industry becomes itself a strong "cultural"
support for projects of hegemony and domination, and within the industry,
the fundamental conception of the law as a civilizing device capable of
promoting order and freedom is part of the social contract. Truly anti-
spectacular critiques stemming from a perception of law as a super-
structure, to be resisted as the oppressive capitalistic domination that
produces it, are perhaps received raising more than one eyebrow. Usually
they fall short of reaching the mainstream channels of scholarly
communication, the most prestigious publishers, and the leading journals.
These venues are dominated by "true" insiders and the rejection letters will
always be based on truly "objective" scholarly standards. Most of the time,
the industry is even able to organize the resistance in a display of
methodological pluralism in the best tradition of the post-modern identity,
thus occasional critical work might see the light. Nevertheless, if ever
critical ideas are published, the books are not promoted and perhaps not
reviewed. Insiders to the industry do not like to confront "radical"
questions. Harmony has to be preserved. Troublemakers are not welcome.
European private law, much like "Law and Economics" in the United
States today, is an industry. It fully participates in what is the truly
dangerous radical anti-law movement-not just that of a few scholars
concerned with equality, struggling for social justice and political
transformation. The real anti-law movement today is promoted and
supported by the corporate domination of public spaces. Scholarly
industries, determining the space of acceptable speech, contribute to this
process of de-legitimization of the traditional political tools potentially
capable of being used to control economic processes: the positive law
131. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L.
REv. 129, 136-38 (2003) (asserting that underlying assumptions of legal economists
includes certain "interpretative biases" that are inherent in human thinking); Jon D.
Hanson & Douglas A. Keysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630 (1999).
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produced by sovereign States. The industry of European private law shares
its crusade against the political-based production of law with that of "Law
and Economics" (and with the other industries glimpsed above). Anti-
positivism turns into anti-state, and anti-state into anti-law. The baby is
thrown away with the bathwater.
In the European Union, the political actors in the corporate anti-law
movement are the same as those in the United States, but the targets and the
means are different. While the targets are the Member States' legal
systems, with their incremental development of institutional systems of
"social" private law (protective formalism, mandatory law, notarized acts,
and measures of contractual justice such as the broad use of
"unconscionability" or "good faith"), the means are the creation of another
industry, the so-called "new" European private law. Because the
transformation of scholarly movements into industries precludes critical
thinking, the consequence of this move is the incapacity to set an
independent agenda and the desire to follow that of corporate-captured
Brussels, in the hope of obtaining funding and prestige. The emphasis on
"contract" as the privileged tool of the European private law process is no
small part of such hegemonic agenda.13 2 The "contractualization" of the
legal and political spaces, in fact, has opened new venues for neo-
liberalism, suggesting a flexible order in which rights and secured positions
are abandoned to the market logic.
While both approaches have been saluted as widely needed
challenges against obsolete legal formalism and positivist approaches to
legal reasoning, in both contexts they ended up as an ideological
legitimization of the new global legislators. In the United States, efficiency
functioned as the key element of success of the anti-law movement by
endorsing its neo-liberal policies. The transformation of European private
law scholarship into an industry has been a successful strategy by which
Brussels has both selected its neo-liberal allies (Lando, Von Bar, etc.) and
has, so to say, "organized" the resistance.13 3 In fact, a "Network of
Excellence" created by the Commission's Sixth Framework Program
brought together neo-liberal expectations with some of the social justice
132. An organization that has flourished for this purpose is the Society for European
Contract Law (SECOLA), which has been highly instrumental to the present focus on
a contractarian vision of the European legal landscape. See SECOLA, http://www.
secola.org (last visited Dec. 4, 2006). Its most recent publishing effort is GENERAL
CLAUSES AND STANDARDS IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: COMPARATIVE LAW, EC
LAW AND CONTRACT LAW CODIFICATION (Stefan Grundmann & Denis Mazeaud eds.,
Private Law in European Context Series, 2006).
133. See Ugo Mattei, Basics First Please! A Critique of Some Recent Priorities Shown by
the Commission's Action Plan, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 297, 297 (A. S.
Hartkamp et al. eds., 3d ed. 2004).
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concerns portrayed by the Manifesto. 134 This Network of Excellence has the
task of drafting the CFR, in which the neo-liberal allies of the Commission
have an important role in driving the process.
35
Many socially concerned scholars avoid asking fundamental
questions such as whether capitalism can be reformed incrementally,
eventually leading to some idealized state of sustainable development.
36
Many such scholars perhaps even believe that the private law system can
play a role in this reform. They seem oblivious to the fact that such a belief
compels European law to follow an agenda established by hegemonic
actors, with no interest in legal civilization, but rather with a clear agenda
of dismantling what is left of it. We argue here that an incremental
transformation towards a progressive dimension in private law is
impossible (while perhaps a gradualist strategy cannot be excluded), that
there is a need for a frontal challenge, and that at least an independent
leftist agenda should be established.
II. SOCIAL CONTRACT LAW AND SOCIAL EUROPE, PART OF THE PROBLEM
OR PART OF THE SOLUTION?
A. The "Social" Critique of Formalism in Contract Law and Its
Historical Inadequacy
To be sure, the meaning of the word "social" in legal matters is much
more complex and endowed with a long and ambiguous pedigree in private
law than the recent and quite feeble resurgence of a political sensitivity in
the debate on European private law would suggest. European private
lawyers share the "social" intellectual tradition as a "vocabulary of legal
concepts" that underwent a radical shift at the beginning of the twentieth
century. 137 Duncan Kennedy, himself associated with the Social Justice
Manifesto, nevertheless considers the "social" as one of the very few
134. See Research Directorate-General, FP6 Instruments: Implementing the Priority
Thematic Areas of the Sixth Framework Programme, EUR. COMM'N (2003),
http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp6/pdf/brochure-fp6_en.pdf.
135. See Martijn W. Hesselink, Capacity and Capability in European Contract Law, 13
EuR. REV. PRIVATE L. 491, 494 (2005).
136. For a critique, see SERGE LATOUCHE, SURVIVRE AU DtVELOPPEMENT (2004).
137. This Article seeks to address and clarify the multiple meanings of the term "social" as
well as to underline its ambiguity and vagueness within the debate on European
private law. This Article uses the term "social" mostly as an adjective in reference to
Europe, (social Europe) and contract law (social contract law), however it also adopts
the term as a noun (the "Social") by referring to a particular form of legal thought or
legal consciousness as described by Duncan Kennedy in his article, Two
Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631
(2003).
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general legal patterns that historically has been capable in the past of
characterizing a global way of thinking about the law.
Initially, the formalist or mid-nineteenth century approach to contract
law was rooted in Kantian philosophy and translated into private law by
Savigny through the notion of individual rights as forms of sovereignty
"absolute within their sphere." 138 Private individuals were guaranteed
freedom from any interference in the enjoyment of their private rights,
which were protected by means of an abuse of deductive reasoning. 1
39
At the beginning of the twentieth century, some European scholars
elaborated a critique of contractual freedom to break with the nineteenth
century will-theory in contract law.140 Their approach was based on the
social and moral perception that industrialization heightened existing
economic disparities, which created unfairness between contractual parties.
According to Kennedy, after a first wave of globalization of "classical"
legal thought, beginning early in the twentieth century a "social legal
consciousness" became capable of globalization, expanding its legal
assumption well beyond the French and German academy where, thanks to
scholars such as Josserand or Gierke, it developed as a reaction to the
formalist thinking of the classical era.' 41 For instance, Jhering's critique of
individual sovereignty brought into question the coherence of legal
reasoning, which was no longer a matter of deductive interpretation but it
was rooted in mechanical social causes and moved by human ends. 142 In the
beginning of the twentieth century, some jurists elaborated an objective
conception of contract law, which is today a crucial legacy among private
138. See FRANZ WIEACKER, STORIA DEL DIRITTO PRIVATO MODERNO [HISTORY OF THE
MODERN PRIVATE LAW] (Umberto Santarelli trans., 1980) (1967). This conception of
individual rights is traced back to the classical legal thought of F.C. von Savigny. In
case of conflict between two individual rights, legal professors resolved the conflict
by deducing a solution from individual rights.
139. See Kennedy, supra note 137 (explaining the abuse of deduction in classical legal
thought).
140. See Hugh Collins, The Voice of the Community in Private Law Discourse, 3 EUR. L.J.
407 (1997).
141. See Kennedy, supra note 137, at 648-51. Kennedy further posits that the social mode
of thought, which characterized the 1900-1950s, has recently yielded to a third
globalization of "Americanized" legal thinking. This mode consists of a neo-formalist
revival in the law, once more understood as a merely technocratic artifact serving the
needs of economic expansion rather than those of human civilization and solidarity.
In a sense, the "social" has been finally abandoned while a mode of reasoning derived
from the social, namely balancing between conflicting policies, is still predominant in
current legal thinking. Id. at 674-75.
142. See RUDOLPH VON JHERING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW (John J. Lalor trans., 1879)





If this social perspective on contract law has a multifaceted
methodology and it is politically ambivalent, there are at least two elements
in its legal language that traveled in time but have radically changed their
meaning when developed by the social consciousness at the beginning of
the 1900s once translated in the current European private law debate post-
1950s.
144
The first element of the vocabulary of the "social" is objectivism in
contract law. For "social" jurists, the unfairness resulting from the
individualist doctrine of freedom of contract can be corrected by an
objective notion of contract, endorsing altruistic values. A contract is no
longer based on the subjective intention of the parties, as an expression of
their free will, but requires a limitation of contractual freedom to fulfill the
objective function of those transactions involving a plurality of social and
economic interests. In response to the rapid industrialization and the
growing interdependence of social reality in the beginning of the twentieth
century, the objective function of contract developed as a doctrine to
address inequalities in Western legal thought and to protect disadvantaged
groups and minorities through special legislation. 145 As a consequence, the
doctrinal shift, still of relevance today, is the move from a conception of
absolute individual rights to notions of abuse of rights and the limits of
contractual freedom as a general limitation of right-based approaches.
146
A second element of the vocabulary of the "social" in contract law is
the strategic invention of solidarity, which characterized the social
economy of republican states struggling against conservative and
revolutionary forces. 147 The rise of organic solidarity in an increasingly
143. See Kennedy, supra note 137, at 648-51.
The Social people had four positive proposals: (1) from the social "is" to the
adaptive "ought" for law, (2) from the deductive to the instrumental approach
to the formulation of norms, (3) not only by the legislature but also by legal
scientists and judges and administrative agencies openly acknowledging gaps
in the formally valid order, (4) anchored in the normative practices ("living
law") that groups intermediate between the state and the individual were
continuously developing in response to the needs of the new interdependent
social formation.
Id. at 651.
144. See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy:
Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form," 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (2000).
145. See WIEACKER, supra note 138, at 289.
146. See Louis JOSSERAND, DE L'ESPRIT DES DROITS ET DE LEUR RELATIVITE: THtORIE DITE
DE L'ABUS DES DROITS [OF SPIRIT OF RIGHTS AND THEIR RELATIVITY] 386 (1927).
147. See JACQUES DONZELOT, L'INVENTION DU SOCIAL: ESSAI SUR LE DtCLIN DES PASSIONS
POLITIQUES [THE INVENTION OF THE SOCIAL: AN ESSAY ON THE DECLINE OF POLITICAL
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specialized and interdependent society influenced the regulation of contract
law. For instance, the housing sector after WWI became a "coerced
housing economy."' 148  Because of the housing crisis in Europe,
governments intervened through rent control legislation that imposed prices
and protected tenants against landlords. When rent control regulations were
under attack all over Europe in the late 1970s, inducing fear that a
regulatory gap would emerge from their dismantlement, Wieacker
highlighted that the legislature could still circumvent the problem with a
sort of "compensatory move," by introducing a contract law regime which
would make it more difficult to terminate the rental contract or by creating
subsidies for social housing. 149
Today, well outside of the original historical context in which the
"social" unfolded in Europe and the United States, what is diffused in the
new European legal culture 50 and the Manifesto might be nostalgia,
synonymous with a time-honored vocabulary that either only reproduces
the social perspective's parts, or produces a misunderstanding of them.
15'
Thus, what is needed today is a full updating of these seemingly critical
notions to the current vocabulary, characterized by the challenges of
economic liberalization and a "third globalization" of legal thought.'
5 2
B. The Critique of the Social and Its Erasure in the Manifesto
There are many possible lines of inquiry that show why the belief in a
reasonable, coherent, and overall social approach in private law is no
longer acceptable without great skepticism. The Social Justice Manifesto
paid no attention to these critiques with the unfortunate result of using the
"social" as a positively loaded notion. This Article provides three of them
among many. First there is what Duncan Kennedy, inspired by European
philosophers and sociologists,' 53 has called the Death of Reason narrative,
PASSIONS] 76-86 (1984) (citing EMILE DURKHEIM, LA DIVISION DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL
[THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY] (1893)) (describing the influence on the social
perspective by tmile Durkheim and the shift in the notion of an organic solidarity
founded on the division of labor which increases specialization and interdependence
among individuals at the same time).
148. See WIEACKER, supra note 138, at 292.
149. Id.
150. See HESSELINK, supra note 67, at 169-7 1.
151. See Duncan Kennedy, Thoughts on Coherence, Social Values and National Tradition
in Private Law, in THE POLITICS OF A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 9, 9-31 (Martijn W.
Hesselink ed., 2006).
152. See Kennedy, supra note 137, at 674-78 (explaining that a third globalization of legal
thought is characterized by a new legal consciousness, which speaks the language of
rights and neo-formalism as well as the one of balancing conflicting policy values).
153. See Max Horkheimer, The End of Reason, in THE ESSENTIAL FRANKFURT SCHOOL
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which has pervaded European legal consciousness since the middle of the
twentieth century.
[L]egal consciousness participates in an even more general or
abstract history of American thought that in turn participates in a
Western story of loss of faith. It is important that loss of faith is
something that happens as an event along a rationalizing work
path that transforms whatever discourse we are talking about, so
that we lose faith (or don't) in reason in a world that has been
transformed by reason, rationalized to the point of arbitrariness,
so to speak.
154
If the "social" was a predominant mode of legal consciousness in
Europe, it also produced the seeds for its end. Through Weberian
disenchantment towards legal reasoning, and its increasing rationalization,
jurists reconciled with a loss of faith narrative, which denied transcendence
and coherence of formal legal rationality while unmasking violence and
coercion in the acceptance of legal rules.155 Thus, rules embedded in the
vocabulary and the institutional imagination of the "social" can no longer
provide unquestioned solutions. Rather, the lack of balancing between
conflicting interests behind each rule, and the unquestioned acceptance of a
legal rule instead of an alternative one, turns out to be the very core of the
inadequacy of a social contract law.
A second critique addresses the skepticism towards welfarist
legislation that, in the 1970s, legal economists in Chicago articulated
clearly, and which influenced legal thought on both sides of the Atlantic. In
their attempt to undermine the possibility of social legislation and its
unintended consequences, mainstream legal economists defended the
notion that welfare legislation was necessarily hurting the people it was
trying to help. 156 In fact, through the increase in prices of consumer goods,
sellers could easily pass on the costs of a warranty to the consumers. In this
way, the beneficiaries of the warranty would be driven out from the market.
For instance, in addressing compulsory terms, which performed an
insurance-like function for buyers, mainstream "Law and Economics"
READER 26, 27-28 (Andrew Arato & Eike Gebhardt eds., 1978); CATHERINE COLLIOT-
THELtNE, LE DtSENCHANTEMENT DE L'TAT: DE HEGEL A MAX WEBER (1992)
(discussing the disenchantment of the state from Hegel to Max Weber).
154. Kennedy, supra note 144, at 98.
155. Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality: Or,
Max Weber's Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western
Legal Thought, in MAX WEBER's ECONOMYAND SOCIETY 322, 337-39 (Charles Camic
et al. eds., 2005).
156. Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L.
REV. 1053, 1058, 1081-82 (1977).
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scholars argued that compulsory warranties created inefficient outcomes by
diminishing overall consumer welfare by creating higher prices. The
warranty undermined the purpose of reducing transaction costs through
contracts of adhesion, while it made marginal groups of consumers worse
off because they were priced out of the market. Thus, according to these
scholars, compulsory warranties in consumer contracts run counter to
redistributive rationales by creating non-optimal market results.1
57
A third reason to be skeptical of the "social" stems from the so-called
constitutional asymmetry theory. 158 European institutions engaged in
centralized private-law reform have often supported the deregulatory
process initiated in the late 1970s by conservative national governments.
For instance, the Product Liability Directive managed to lower the
standards of protection for consumers in several Member States, especially
where these rules were not highly visible because they were created
through judicial lawmaking. 59 From the viewpoint of welfarist advocates,
Member State autonomy is severely limited by the new European legal
order for the sake of achieving a fully integrated market, and
Europeanization threatens to dismantle national social provisions. Because
of a "constitutional asymmetry" pervading the European Union, neither the
Community decision-maker, nor the Member States have the
comprehensive regulatory capacity to undertake a strategic compensatory
move to implement reforms or create new contract, administrative, or
criminal law rules.' 60 Obviously, faith in the "social" loses much of its
steam if one embraces the constitutional asymmetry theory.
These three lines of critical inquiry suggest departing from the
vocabulary of the "social" in private law. Rather, they strive to find
answers to the critique of the "social." Not only should progressive projects
articulate these answers, but they ought to set aside the "contested
concept"'161 of social values for their agenda, no matter if the word "social"
157. Id. at 1067. The efficiency of standardized contract lies in its internal construction:
once the seller pre-establishes the terms of the contract, the consumer is presented
with a "take it or leave it" agreement. Both buyer and seller thereby avoid further
transaction costs of negotiating individual agreements, while a legal rule restricting
the enforceability of standardized contracts creates large efficiency loss.
158. See Fritz W. Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of
Diversity, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 645 (2002).
159. See Caruso, supra note 43, at 753.
160. See Daniela Caruso, Limits of the Classic Method: Positive Action in the European
Union After the New Equality Directives, 44 -ARV. INT'L L.J. 331, 345 (2003);
Fernanda Nicola, Another View on European Integration: Distributive Stakes in the
Harmonization of European Law, in PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, RETHINKING
STRATEGIES AND IDEOLOGY (Clare Dalton & Dan Danielson eds., forthcoming 2007).
161. Kennedy, supra note 151, at 9-31.
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is accompanying words like "justice," "rights," and "modes of legal
consciousness," which are only contextually meaningful today. Most
importantly, in the European context, one should give full consideration to
the fact that the Network of Excellence of scholars drafting the CFR have
included "social justice" into a hegemonic project, that of constructing the
private law industry that is part either of the third globalization or imperial
Americanization of law. Further it is mandatory to avoid confusion
between the "social" as a scholarly notion, intrinsic to private law, and the
"social" as a political essence of current Europe, something that we turn to
explore now.
C. Social Europe: A Solution or a Competitive Hegemonic Project?
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the international political field has
been reconstructed as an essential end-of-history. Socialist alternatives
either have been largely erased (think about the experience of Cuba, or the
more recent ones in Venezuela or Bolivia), demonized (North Korea), or
reconstructed in Western-capitalists' terms (think about China). Non-
socialist alternatives have been relentlessly fought (Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran,
etc.). Within the dominant West, an opposition-that between European
social capitalism and Neo-American capitalism-has been introduced,1
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emphasized, 163 and accepted as a self-image of many European moderate
leftists.
European capitalism has been characterized by a much more social
flavor than its United States counterpart.164 Should European law be able to
capture and reflect, in the rules of the game it sets forward, some of the
values comprised in the "European social model,' it might impose itself as
a model capable of competing with United States hegemony. Is that a
desirable outcome as seen from the left? Is a model of gentle capitalism,
based on a radically unequal pattern of resource distribution (due to
colonial accumulation and double standards in international trade), what we
should look forward to?
Across disciplines, scholars have articulated the European identity in
162. This opposition between Rehnan capitalism and Neo-American capitalism has been
introduced by the French economist MICHEL ALBERT in CAPITALISME CONTRE
CAPITALISME (1991).
163. Cf. JEREMY RIFKIN, THE EUROPEAN DREAM: How EUROPE'S VISION OF THE FUTURE Is
QUIETLY ECLIPSING THE AMERICAN DREAM (Polity Press 2004) (showing that the
European culture's commitment to community values and quality of life over
materialism and individual goals results in improved holistic well-being as measured
at a community and individual level).
164. See GIAN MARIA GROS-PIETRO ET AL., ASSETTI PROPRIETARI E MERCATI FINANZIARI
EUROPEI (2001).
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opposition to the United States model of homologated capitalism. The
European Union stands as a softer, more diverse, and ultimately more
social model of market integration.' 65 If the United States stands as a multi-
ethnic melting pot pervaded by racial and socio-economic segregation, the
European Union stands as a welfare regime that protects its citizens, but not
its outsiders, through rights-based and solidaristic multicultural claims.
66
We should be wary of such flawed theories that are aimed to construct
capitalism as a sustainable model of development; provided some moderate
reforms of its most savage distortions are cured. The essence of capitalism
is much easier to perceive when it has its gloves off, and one of the risks of
the social aesthetics is exactly its working as an ideological device,
masking a reality of hypocrisy, neo-colonialism, and exploitation. No
progressive agenda should point at an alternative hegemonic model.
Hegemony is what should be relentlessly criticized, and the real issue, on
which it is hard to take a side, is whether the law can or cannot serve at
least transitional, anti-hegemonic purposes.
In departing from these competitive hegemonic views, from a
progressive political perspective, the possibility of Social Europe is no
more than a compromise of realism, but it might, at least, be a first step in
the gradualist construction of a more civilized worldly legal landscape. 67 A
progressive agenda ought to look for solutions by considering the variety of
European social models through the awareness that market outsiders,
immigrants, and those who have no access to business transactions, who
may be the first beneficiaries of Social Europe should a platform of
opening it up become successful. Thus, European integration could be seen
as a moderate redistributive exercise.
We will pose here only a few questions for discussion that have been
largely ignored by European private law serving the function of an
industry. Our goal is to tackle those preliminary issues that the continued
scholarly debate should clarify to make political choices possible.
165. See ALBERTO ALESINA & EDWARD L. GLAESER, FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE US AND
EUROPE: A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE (Rodolfo DeBenedetti Lecture Series, 2004);
Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union 9-10 (June 13,
2006) (unpublished paper prepared for presentation at the ARENA Seminar, Centre
for European Studies, University of Oslo), http://www.arena.uio.no/events/seminar
papers/2006/ZeitlinJune06.pdf.
166. See ETIENNE BALIBAR, WE, THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE? (James Swenson trans., 2004);
HAuKE BRUNKHORST, SOLIDARITY: FROM Civic FRIENDSHIP TO A GLOBAL LEGAL
COMMUNITY (Jeffrey Flynn trans., 2005).
167. Cf Guy Canivet & Horatia Muir Watt, Europdanisation du droitpriv etjustice
Sociale [Europeanization of Private Law and Social Justice], 13 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
EUROPAISCHES PRIVATRECHT [Z. Eu. P.] 517, 517-22 (2005) (F.R.G.).
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Institutions should serve a purpose. Proposed reforms and changes should
create advantages and benefits for the community they serve.
Consequently, the first question to pose is: whose interests does the
European private law system have to serve? Is the European law only to
serve the interests of the Europeans? Alternatively, is Europe a sufficiently
strong world power (both in terms of economy and culture) that its legal
system can influence global developments in the present moment of high
uncertainty about what path we should walk in the future of world
capitalism? We submit that European private lawyers should take full
advantage of the cosmopolitan perspective stemming from their more
cosmopolitan background, which has proven to be a necessity rather than a
choice in present-day Europe. For example, they should think worldly,
imagine a legal structure of the European market capable of working as a
model that serves the global community and not merely the European
interests.
European lawyers, if paralleled with their U.S. counterparts, have
been good comparativists but very poor economists and social scientists.
This lack of knowledge of other social sciences has, for a long period of
time, confined European lawyers (common lawyers as well as civilians) to
a useless black-letter style of legal positivistic analysis that has made them
completely disregard the social and economic impact of their legal
constructions. Once the costs of legalism have been understood, at least by
some avant-garde (mostly comparativists) in a relatively recent past, the
poor conditions of the background understanding can stop playing a
negative role. In the efforts of their kampf against positivism and in the late
and hasty discovery of the existence and virtues of the market, many
European lawyers (as well as a large number of policy makers throughout
the political spectrum) have trusted the virtues of an unregulated market
much more than what is in order. Rather than limiting and trimming
regulation where wasteful, European legal culture, similar to "Law and
Economics" in the United States, participated in surrendering the political
process and its legitimated production of binding rules of behavior to
unrestricted market practices only softly regulated, when regulated at all.
This trend, to say the least, is based on bad economics.
European policy makers should not underestimate the major potential
impact of what happens today in Europe in the current lawless global
corporate marketplace. Many people in the world (including, in the United
States, the many discontents of the World Bank, and the IMF as global
lawmakers) would welcome a truly responsible piece of economic
legislation, something that Europe owes to humankind to make good its
less than respectable exploitive past. A radically reformed European legal
system, prestigious because of the culture behind it, could become, in the
global world, a true world model; provided that mainstream European
2006)
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intellectuals and policy makers stop their self-congratulatory attitude
stemming from an ideological construction of our tradition, as if Europe
were not in the past and in the present responsible for much suffering and
strife in the world. If, as a leading legal system, Europe begins to change its
attitude towards lawless capital globalization in favor of a more progressive
and redistributive model of economic development, this could be the first
move of a countertrend away from global hegemony and exploitation.
68
D. Social Europe Versus Socialist Europe
Just like in using notions such as "the social," European private
lawyers have deployed a term that lost its contextual values and its most
sophisticated legal implications. Similarly, European scholars have plunged
into European integration and a "third globalization" with no awareness of
their own path in the building of a progressive legal regime. In the last
fifteen years a lot has been written on the fall of socialism in the former
Soviet Union. A variety of explanations, more or less self-congratulatory,
have been advanced but no attempt has been made to shed light on two
aspects, both strictly connected, with the present state of European private
law. First, no attempt has been made to appraise the positive contribution of
Socialist and Communist scholars to private law in Europe, including such
diverse experiences as the "Uso alternativo del diritto"'169 in the Italian legal
academy of the 1970s and the East German Civil Code of 1975.170 These
genuine and ambitious contributions to the development of a more
inclusive system of private law have been hastily and unfairly dismissed.
Second, no effort has been made to appraise the negative consequences for
European law of the fall of the Soviet Block. Nevertheless, a clear
appreciation of the impact of the release of Cold War pressures on
European law makers after the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall is the
indispensable context for any significant analysis of social trends in
European law today.
168. See Stephen R. Gill & David Law, Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of
Capital, 33 INT'L STUD. Q. 475 (1989) ("[explaining] some of the conditions under
which a more 'transnational' regime of accumulation and an associated hegemony of
transnational capital might develop").
169. See PIETRo BARCELLONA & THOMAS BLANKE, I L'uso ALTERNATIVO DEL DIRITTO:
SCIENZA GIURIDICA E ANALISI MARXISTA (1973); PIETRO BARCELLONA & THOMAS
BLANKE, II ORTODOSSIA GrURIDICA E PRATICA POLITICA: SCIENZA GIURIDICA E ANALISI
MARXISTA (1973); see also CATEGORIE GIURIDICHE E RAPPORTI SOCIALI: IL PROBLEMA
DEL NEGOZIo GIURIDICO (Pietro Barcellona & Cesare Salvi eds., 1978).
170. It is therefore particularly important that we recognize the initiative of Professor Luca
Nivarra of the University of Palermo (Italy) who has convened a conference on the
legacy of the "seventies" in private law for July 2006. Information on the conference
is available at http://www.unipa.it/-dipriv/ascarelli.htm (last visted Dec. 5, 2006).
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One can observe, in general, that private law in Europe historically
unfolded remotely from social concerns-the traditional domain of the
public law in the civilian taxonomy. Naturally, there have been a variety of
early counter-tendencies in this mainstream attitude to consider wealth
disparity and power imbalance as irrelevant to private law. The rich debate
on the so-called "social function" of rights that occupied the 1930s in
Europe witnesses such wealth of thought, spanning from the Second
International to the Catholic solidaristic tradition, even reaching some
aspects of the so-called "fascist conception" of property law. 171 Even in the
mainstream, nevertheless, a political platform of equality and an agenda of
redistribution of wealth, mostly but not only located in the public law
tradition, has characterized, with different degrees of intensity, the first
three-quarters of the twentieth century. Such a platform, put at the center of
national political processes by the workers and trade union movements,
stimulated the growth of the Welfare State institutions, a more or less
conscious strategic concession of the industrial bourgeoisie to avoid an
anti-capitalist revolution. While this social welfare has often been fiercely
resisted both from the right (particularly by the more reactionary and
authoritarian industrialists) and from the left (challenging social institutions
as Foucaultian controlling processes), it is a fact that the weak actors of
society have received some material benefits from the birth of welfare state
institutions, with consequent increases in human civilization and dignity.
In a number of countries where socialist and communist parties have
been able to survive the relentless persecution of Fascist regimes, reaching
some degree of power through the Cold War, some local legal scholarship
has developed a genuine social dimension, something far more advanced
than the "third way" compromise reached in the mentioned Social Justice
Manifesto. Consideration should be given to the fact that the Welfare State,
and more generally, the traits of the so-called European social (or Rhenan)
capitalism, developed together with a variety of protective policies and
within a strong role of the State into the Member States' economies, which
have been anathema to Brussels from the very beginning of the European
Common Market.
The market is healthy when there is open competition with other
institutions, especially within the legal system and the political process.
1 72
However, the Common Market should neither be ignored nor made the
object of idolatry, as the accession in May 2004 signified for many of the
newcomers to Social Europe in departing from their Socialist and
171. See KARL RENNER, THE INSTITUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTIONS
(Otto Kahn-Freund ed., Agnes Schwarzchild trans., Routledge/Thommes Press 1976);
see also Kennedy, supra note 137, at 648-51.
172. See NORTH, supra note 125.
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undemocratic past. 173 The market should be regulated to the extent
necessary to make all the actors pay for their social costs. Such regulation,
short from coming only from the public law and from ex-ante government
authorization, should be rooted in substantive private law rules accessible
to everybody and given bite by a variety of effective remedies. This aspect
introduces another crucial aspect of a progressive agenda.
The law in the West is an important aspect of the cultural identity of a
community. Europe is in desperate need of such an identity-building
exercise, from the perspective of anybody who is interested in providing a
viable alternative to the present, unsustainable, pattern of capitalist
development and exploitation. Dismantling the social institutions of
capitalism, such as access to law for the poor, in favor of the return to a
laissez-faire philosophy, in the name of market flexibility, as it consistently
happened since the fall of the Cold War, is not a necessity. It is only
reactionary politics.
III. SETTING A PROGRESSIVE AGENDA IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW
We shall now try to advance a first step in the outline of a policy
agenda for the purpose of developing methodologies and strategies for a
progressive model of private law, radically breaking with the present,
unchallenged trends in European private law. Despite the fact that one of
these authors has actually participated in the drafting of the Social Justice
Manifesto, we believe that the time is ripe for a thorough break with its
moderate, half-way logic. In this light, participation in the drafting of the
Manifesto back in 2003 should be seen as a "gradualist" strategy, in the
sense developed by, among others, Togliatti as early as 1946.174 The time is
now ripe for its frontal challenge. In a moment of unprecedented
acceleration, when government-appointed members to the CFR are
beginning to give institutional life to what only two years ago seemed only
an ill-conceived idea, 175 the construction of the European private law
industry (symbolized by the European Commission-funded creation of the
"network of excellence") requires radical critique and production of
alternatives now, before it is too late.
The setting of a new progressive (or if you prefer Marxist/Socialist)
agenda for European private law should start from the full exposure of the
173. See David Kennedy, Turning to Market Democracy: A Tale of Two Architectures, 32
HARV. INT'L L.J. 373 (1991); see also DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE:
REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM 171-76 (2004).
174. See John Bacher, Eurocommunism: Showing a Human Face to Both Blocs, PEACE
MAG., Feb.-Mar. 1987, at 27, available at http://www.peacemagazine.org/archive/
v03n1p27.htm.
175. See Mattei, supra note 133.
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"third ways," "end of history," and "new labor" logics that dominate the
Manifesto, which makes it participate in the "harmonious" logic 176 of
construction of the "inevitability" of the current patterns of power disparity,
both within the Union and outside of the borders of fortress Europe. By
claiming a "social" exception to the neo-liberal logic, and by making the
"social" an alternative to the current model of neo-liberal domination, the
Manifesto blames the current state of affairs on the technocratic way in
which Brussels handles the issue. Moreover, it implies some moral
superiority of the European model of capitalism as opposed to the U.S. one;
an assumption that is entirely unproven and that only serves to hide a
higher level of political hypocrisy.
The European political logics of the Manifesto, just like the dominant
platform of the Democratic Party in the United States, are nothing more
than political superstructures in the present phase of global capitalism.
These logics cannot be distinguished in moral terms, but should be
critically appreciated as political allies in maintaining the economic and
social status quo and, for what matters here, the system of private law as a
tool of decentralized domination rather than of cultural expression and
liberation. This strategy of pointing at the responsibilities of some extremes
or exceptions, rather than appreciating those of the dominating middle
ground is particularly diffused in the privileged social class of jurists, who
thrive in its business of granting principled legitimization to inequality and
exploitation.1
77
Thus, the current necessity of the legal left 78 to face a line of
questions that Pietro Barcellona was posing more than thirty years ago and
that need some answers in the current transformative phase of European
private law: "In what conditions is it possible to be politically active while
remaining jurists? What political change is possible to reach with the tools
of the law? What are the legal tools that should be preferred in a
perspective of (more or less radical) transformation of society?"'
179
These questions point today, even more than thirty years ago, at the
political necessity of a dramatic discontinuity in the settled balance of
power in the dialectic between private law as an agency of market
176. In the sense discussed by LAURA NADER in HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND
CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC MOUNTAIN VILLAGE 307-08 (1990).
177. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (Daniel
Heller-Roazen trans., 1998).
178. For some proposals in need of being transformed into legal praxis, see most recently
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD THE LEFT PROPOSE? (2005).
Unfortunately, Unger has given up, in recent years, on the issue of how to transform
these proposals into legal action.
179. See PIETRO BARCELLONA, L' Uso ALTERNATIVO DEL DIRITTO: ORTODOSs[A GIURIDICA
E PRATICA POLITICA (1973).
2006]
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
oppression as opposed to an agency of economic and political liberation. 180
Given the present irresponsible and destructive phase of capitalistic
accumulation and development, this intellectual break, pointing at
progressive alternatives and exploring them in detail, should happen sooner
rather than later. This Article should be seen also as a plea to other
"resisting" legal scholars and intellectuals to aggregate around a
construction of such alternatives based on a political platform alternative to
the moderate one of the Manifesto. At the moment, the social dimension of
European private law is almost an oxymoron, if not an alternative model of
hegemony, evoked as an aspiration more than as a political platform by a
few concerned scholars. Unfortunately, in the present phase, the social
mode of European private law only works as false consciousness, offering
a degree of respectability to a field, that of European private law, whose
DNA is inherently subservient to the requirements of global capitalism.
A. Re-Politicizing the Process
In an attempt to draft some priorities, a first requirement is that of
humility and a sense of a limit. In general, jurists, as such, should not
attempt to substitute politicians in making choices impacting the general
public, so that a first limit of action-that of political legitimacy, as
opposed to professionalism-should be regained. Contrariwise, private
lawyers should be aware and defiant of the traditional limits of their own
field. Private law is an institutional structure bom in Europe out of
requirements of early capitalistic accumulation, itself functional to the early
imperial transformations of the Roman Republic and Renaissance
colonialism. It is possibly the area of law most compromised with, and
intimately related to, capitalism so that its anti-capitalistic and counter-
hegemonic use is the most problematic. In setting the agenda of a
progressive legal and political platform, therefore, private law jurists
should stretch their reach to the borders of the traditional subject matter.
We need, on the one hand, to reinstate the limits of law as opposed to
political action. But on the other hand, we need to bluntly overcome the
limits of traditional private law as an agency facilitating accumulation and
exploitation to occupy and integrate in the fundamental structure of
property rights, which certainly includes contracts and torts-those more
progressive areas dealing with the individual welfare and rights of the
lower classes as opposed to the exploiting elites. What should be our
attitude concerning the ownership, individual or corporate, of the means of
production? What limits should we set to economic rights and freedoms?
Should we develop a full theory of rights abuse that is able to confront
180. This dialectic is explored in detail in UGo MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER:
IMPERIAL USES OF THE RULE OF LAW (forthcoming 2007).
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arguments that fear the possible dictatorship of courts of law? How can we
civilize corporate behavior?
While we do not think that the decision on whether to attempt a
comprehensive reform of European private law (possibly inspired by values
of social justice) and the choice of values informing this reform should
belong to professionals, we believe that the legal left should work out
detailed proposals on issues such as the ones touched upon in the previous,
incomplete list of questions. The decision of whether to change the law is a
core business of the political process. But the political process should be
put in the position to evaluate technically sustainable alternatives to avoid
reproduction of the kind of mistakes that have produced failures of socialist
alternatives in a variety of political contexts.
True, in the quite short history of the European Union, most major
choices have been carried on by technocrats and imposed over the will of
the people. Possibly the creation of a euro zone is the most important of
those. Nevertheless, the lack of participation in the adoption of EC
legislation that is plaguing Europe and the consequent resistance in the
adoption of a European Constitution, imposed from the top down, should
not be seized by influential professional guilds (such as that of academic
lawyers) to claim privileges and powers that clearly do not belong to them.
The spirit of the European people and of the working class majority should
be able to emerge in a genuinely popular constitutional effort, in which the
wind of socialism might once more blow, if for no other reason than
because of the miserable state of affairs produced by current neo-liberal
trends. It is the province of progressive jurists to expose the contradictions
of democracy double-talk that disempowers the people by the skillful use
of ideology.
A master of progressive private law has already suggested the need to
appoint a politically responsible body to revise and suggest reforms in the
domain of private law, authoritatively developing a suggestion 181 that one
of us has also hinted to sometime ago. 182 Struggling to obtain such a
politically legitimized and responsible body, perhaps on the model of the
British Law Commission, looks like an unavoidable pre-requisite to allow
the socialist component of European private law culture to impose its
alternatives imperio rationis. Giving back the political choices to whom
they belong, and taking them away from technocrats and self-appointed
academics, certainly aids in understanding priorities. Moreover, a
legitimate process will prevent that mode of soft influence exercised by
corporate actors and will set the next agenda on European private law. One
181. Stefano Rodotd, I Codice civile e il processo costituente europeo, 23 RIVISTA
CRITICA DEL DiRiTTO PRIVATO 21 (2005).
182. See MATTEI, supra note 122.
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of the most interesting (and dangerous) ways in which the agenda is set is
by transformation of otherwise critical modes of thought (for example
independent scholarship on European private law) into organized, quasi-
political "industries," where scholars carry on a political platform, and
develop stakes and loyalties to their collective "accomplishment,"
abandoning any critical doubt whatsoever.
Martijn Hesselink has been one of the most prominent voices among
the moderate scholars of the Social Justice Manifesto, advocating for a re-
politicization of the process of adoption of a European contract code.18 3 In
looking at the past difficulties in implementing private law directives,
Hesselink is skeptical of the possibility of adopting a comprehensive
Common Frame of Reference by 2009, as the Commission aims to
achieve. 8 4 However, in looking at the example of the Dutch Civil Code
adopted in 1992, he suggested that the Commission should submit, similar
to the Dutch Commission in the 1950s, a list of questions regarding the
substance of the CFR to the European Parliament. This has been one of the
possible strategies proposed by scholars to re-politicize the process of
Europeanization of private law by making it more public and less technical.
It is true that many of the issues to be faced in the "making" of private
law are of a somewhat "technical"'' 8 5 nature, so the public understanding of
their political implications can be only limited. Nevertheless, it is
extraordinarily important for at least the scholarly and legal communities at
large to be aware of the fundamental political implications of the different
options. This is particularly crucial these days when a large variety of
discourses and rhetorical devices are uncritically imported from the United
States, either as trendy cultural movements, or as self-serving solutions
imposed or marketed by the almighty transnational economic actors
together with their faithful servants-the mega-law firms-and, more
generally, the mainstream legal community.
But once the political dimension is understood-and the Manifesto
has certainly been useful from this point of view-the issue of the leftist
political agenda is entirely to be faced and, as we hope we have been able
to explain, the word "social" might well be more part of the problem than
of the solution.
183. Martijn W. Hesselink, The Politics of a European Civil Code, 10 EuR. L.J. 675
(2004).
184. Martijn W. Hesselink, The Ideal of Codification and the Dynamics of
Europeanisation: The Dutch Experience, 12 EuR. L.J. 279, 305 (2006).
185. Cf Duncan Kennedy, The Political Stakes in "Merely Technical" Issues of Contract
Law, 10 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 7 (2002).
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B. Toward a Transformative Agenda for European Private Law
European private law has many lessons to learn from the past in order
to accomplish the challenges for the future and to be transformed for the
purposes of a progressive agenda. To begin with, it is imperative to
overcome the great abyss between the common law and the civil law
traditions in order to profitably learn from both experiences. Reform should
reflect contributions from all the legal traditions of Europe, and we would
suggest, also from those non-European traditions that a ripe community of
legal scholars well grounded in comparative law, might be understood as
useful for the task of legal civilization. This is why, in the domain of
European private law, a progressive agenda should make all possible
efforts to give a voice to the traditionally recessive legal cultures (the Latin
as well as all the new accessions), today plainly ignored or treated with
condescendence in all the so-called "integrative" projects of European
private law making.
186
European legal scholarship (or science as once was said) should learn
to think more freely, should break the still-present cages of formalism, and
should challenge the established taxonomies and all the artificial
boundaries, like those between private law and public law, or between
substantive and procedural law. The task in front of us is to produce a
restructured private law system capable of becoming the milestone of
twenty-first century social and political regulation of market forces. We are
in need of a regulation of market transactions capable of serving the
interests of everybody, not only of strong economic actors nor, of course,
Europeans only. Such an effort, which is clearly the province of an
inclusive leftist agenda, must be started before it is too late.
Many things that traditional formalist (particularly civilian) cages of
learning have precluded from being considered as top priorities in private
law should be approached and thoroughly explored. Remedies, access to
justice, environmental law, protection of diffused interests, fundamental
antitrust regulations, and many other connected fields should all be
thoroughly explored. The process of socially concerned European law
reform is an exercise of learning by doing. It is, however, an exercise that
needs to be done within a conscious political plan to accomplish the result.
A minimalist effort should at least locate those fundamental principles
that can readily be used by courts to force market actors to internalize the
social costs that they produce and transfer on to weaker actors. This is why
limiting the focus on contract law, as it is the trend legitimized by the
186. This claim is developed in OPENING UP EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: THE COMMON CORE
PROJECT (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., forthcoming Jan. 2007). For more
information, see Von Bar & Swann, supra note 60.
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Social Justice Manifesto, is both a mistake and a hegemonic strategy to be
denounced. The outcome is to shift private law even more openly to the
service of global market capitalism.'
8
Even seen from the more conservative perspectives of social sciences,
and of economics in particular, private law is an integrated body of
fundamental rules of the game. 188 Contract, tort, property, restitution, and
corporate law, in this perspective, play a very similar role. They integrate
and complete each other, as private law rules introducing correct sets of
incentives for a marketplace, in which the social costs are appropriately
internalized. Variations in form might be substantial. These variations are,
however, the result of historical accidents (sometimes promoted as legal
culture, but that could be described more critically as survivals in the
sociological tradition or path dependency in the economic one) that do not
change the fundamental substance of the law. 189 The truth of the matter is
that taxonomy in the law must only serve the purpose of organizing
knowledge and should never be seen as something determining the
substantive solution to social problems. For too many years, European
lawyers (again, in the Continent as well as in the common law) have been
victims of the illusion that deducing (or inducing) rules from taxonomy
could be seen as a scientific exercise. Such a formalistic exercise has not
only been a waste of time, but has many times guided ill-considered
decisions.
For some years now, a project known as The Common Core of
European Private Law has been carried on as a painstaking effort to
understand how things really are in European private law. 190 The efforts of
this group have been conscious of the many difficulties and
epistemological objections facing this project. Nevertheless, their
experience has been that taxonomy is bound to become a cage if any
attempt is made to use it beyond its very minimal (yet so important at the
same time) task of organizing materials. As long as the law contains a
regime comprehensive enough to force at least internalization of social
costs, any taxonomy works. Alternatively, the purest taxonomy will not
187. See Mauro Bussani, The Contract Law Codification Process in Europe: Policies,
Targets and Time Dimensions, in AN ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW, supra note 72, at 159, 159-79.
188. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution,
73 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1985).
189. A full fledged critique of the conservative use of the idea of legal culture can be found
in Ugo Mattei & Anna di Robilant, The Art and Science of Critical Scholarship:
Postmodernism and International Style in the Legal Architecture of Europe, 75 TuL.
L. REV. 1053 (2001).
190. See Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach to European Private
Law, 3 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 339 (1997).
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contribute anything to legality and legal civilization.
One important lesson that we can learn from social sciences, and from
the most advanced approaches to legal scholarship, is the importance of the
dynamic process in the production of institutions, as well as of technology
and products. The processes, as well as the outcomes, should attract the
attention of scholars, judges, and legislators. Most of the externalities and
most of the social costs dumped in the backyard of our weaker neighbors in
the South of the world are created during the process of the production of
commodities that are vastly consumed by the almost half-billion people
that comprise the European market.' 91 Such processes of production are
traditionally and simply ignored by private law, as these processes are only
concerned with the final outcomes. This state of affairs simply shows that
European consumers pay too little for their commodities since their prices
do not reflect the true social costs of production (environment, labor
exploitation, etc.) and European capitalism is once again subsidized by
former colonies. Moreover, multi-national corporate logo-lords (mostly
European and North American) make unfair profits by pocketing the value
of such social costs. In both cases, such economic realities should be a
concern for the European policy maker when busy drafting the rules of the
game.
It is the duty of a progressive agenda to expose this lack of attention.
To be sure, we know that a large number of successful market competitors
in the European market offer an inefficiently high number of products at an
artificially low price. Such multi-national competitors push smaller market
actors out of business. Smaller market actors do not externalize costs of
production on people in the South of the world. Usually by acting locally,
such weaker actors have to comply with European standards of labor
conditions and environmental protection and, as a consequence, cannot
supply as many commodities at such low prices. Producers' liability, one of
the frontiers in European private law, only covers social costs imposed by
the outcome of the productive process in the consumers' market. Indeed,
this is a small fraction of the externality problems that a system of private
law that approaches problems globally should tackle.
This basic change of perspective-from the outcome to the process-
is bound to lead to very important insights, cutting across a significant
section of the substantive rules of the game. Such a perspective may, more
than anything else, cure the presently existing gaps between substantive
rules, remedies, and procedures; a plague that the civilian dogmatic attitude
should not infect the European legal process. Focusing on processes as well
as outcomes is likely to allow scholars and policy makers (and perhaps
191. For a fascinating discussion of this process of externalization, see NAOMI KLEIN, No
LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES (Picador 2000) (1999).
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even the people!) to perceive the importance of the stakes that are on the
table.
A progressive European private law, for the time being, does not
really exist. In fact, such European private law can only stem from an
ideological break with the current phase in which Europe is a servant
agency of global capitalism. Such a revolutionary break requires an agenda
that is capable of spelling out priorities.
Any transformative agenda in European private law should begin with
the full disruption of the cages of formalist legal thinking that inhibit the
people's appreciation of the full domain of the legal possibility in the
process of social transformation and political decisions. 192 More generally,
after formalism, the next enemy of a progressive legal system in Europe is
professionalism. Professionalism also should be dismissed as the main
agency of legal change. In fact, professionalism is by its very nature an
elitist phenomenon, which should be subordinate to a democratic political
process.
Socially responsible legal change can stem only from the
empowerment of the people, thus exploiting the justice motive of the weak
and the oppressed. This is why the issue of access to law, which requires a
substantial investment of public funds into the judicial process, should be a
top priority in our progressive agenda.
Only in a second phase, once the people begin to trust the law again,
by fully appreciating its transformative potential, could the task of spelling
out the substantive rules of the game be started, perhaps in a first phase
along the political compromise of promoting and asserting redistributive
and progressive projects within European capitalism. However, one should
be aware that the social traits of European capitalism were able to develop
only in competition with the Socialist alternative. Today, until the threat of
such an alternative becomes credible again, it is much more difficult to
overcome and transform the many rules, principles, and ideologies that are
biased in favor of profit over people. But departing from the current
ideology remains to be done, and it is better for professional disruption of
the new European private law industry to happen sooner rather than later.
C. Restructuring the Field: Constitutions and Codes
In 2005, the French and the Dutch rejected the proposed European
Constitution. 193 In the weeks leading up to the vote, left and right political
192. See Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J.
HUM. RTS. 146, 150-51, 166-72 (1998).
193. See Ratification of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, http://europa.eu.
int/constitution/referendum_en.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2006) ("The people of France
and the Netherlands rejected the text of the Constitution on 29 May and 1 June
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parties strengthened a "No" coalition around two major important claims
and obscured other voices in the process, except the one, very popular
voice on the right, of racism and xenophobia.' 94 While racism has been the
independent agenda of the right, no such independent agenda has been
produced on the left. The first common claim was that the Constitution
would enforce a neo-liberal economic model in the European Union.195 The
second claim was that national governments should not be part of a
technocratic Europe whose decisions take precedence over the decisions of
respectively. In the light of these results, the European Council, meeting on 16 and 17
June 2005, considered that 'we do not feel that the date initially planned for a report
on ratification of the Treaty, 1 November 2006, is still tenable, since those countries
which have not yet ratified the Treaty will be unable to furnish a clear reply before
mid-2007."' (quoting Press Release, Luxembourg Presidency of the Council of the
European Union, Jean-Claude Juncker States that There Will Be a Period for
Reflection and Discussion but the Process to Ratify the Constitutional Treaty Will
Continue with No Renegotiation (June 17, 2005), http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/
communiques/2005/06/l 6jclj-ratif/index.html) (emphasis added)).
194. See Jurgen Habermas, Le non illusoire de la gauche, NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, May 5,
2005.
La capacit6 de regulation de I'Etat-nation ne suffit plus depuis longtemps A
faire piece aux consequences ambivalentes de la mondialisation economique.
Ce qui est crldbrd aujourd'hui comme < module social europden >> ne peut
6tre drfendu que si, dans le cadre mdme de l'Europe, la politique est capable
de revenir A la hauteur des marchs. Ce n'est qu'au niveau europden que l'on
pourra r~cupdrer tout ou partie de la capacit6 de rrgulation politique de toute
fagon perdue au niveau de l'Etat-nation. Les membres de I'UE renforcent
aujourd'hui leur cooperation dans les domaines qui relrvent de la politique
de sdcurit6 - la justice, le droit penal et l'immigration. Une gauche active et
lucide dans sa politique europdenne aurait ddjA depuis longtemps incit6 A une
harmonisation beaucoup plus poussre, y compris dans les domaines de la
politique 6conomique et fiscale.
Id. ("The regulatory capacity of nation states is no longer effective due to the
ambivalent consequences of globalization. Today the well-known 'European social
model' can only be defended if European politics achieve the same level of
integration of European markets. Only at the European level could we get back, in
part or fully, the political regulatory capacity that was lost at the state level. Today
EU Member States are strengthening their cooperation within national security-
justice, criminal law, and immigration. However, for a while, an active and lucid left
on European politics has asked for a harmonization policy much more radical and
complete on tax and economic policies." (translated by authors)).
195. See Bernard Cassen, ATTAC Against the Treaty, 33 NEw LEFT REV. 27, 27-28 (2005),
available at http://www.newlefreview.net/?issue=267 (follow "Bernard Cassen,
ATTAC Against the Treaty" hyperlink). "The collective appropriation of the treaty
also had the effect of 'naturalizing' the European question, long considered beyond
the scope of national politics. For the first time, the link has been made between neo-
liberal policies formulated at EU level and those pursued 'at home."' Id.
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democratically elected national legislatures.' 96 The fundamental paradox
that has characterized the constitutional process in Europe might well close
the issue of legitimate private law, forcing it into a conundrum. On the one
hand, a progressive transformation of private law requires its recognition as
a fundamental constitutional choice at the European level; but at the same
time, many progressive visions resist major transformations of European
private law in fear of capitalistic hegemony. On the other hand, the
mainstream conservative forces, those attempting to avoid the encounter
between private law and the political process, are the ones more active in
pursuing ambitious transformations of the private law system. It is difficult
to emerge from this conundrum, and progressive legal theory is at risk of
suffocation.
197
In the aftermath of the demise of the European Constitutional Treaty,
the European Union is experiencing a contradictory process, which can be
looked upon from a global perspective. On the one hand, the European
Union is now the institutional structure of a market for some half-billion
people, with a larger GDP than the United States, 198 experiencing a
continuous process of integration from the legal and economic
perspectives. On the other hand, divisions and rivalry between the most
important Member States, the lack of effective political processes and
policymaking, as well as visionary euro-friendly platforms on the left, have
strengthened the notion of a persisting democratic deficit while weakening
the institutional imagination of technocrats, jurists, and scholars. The
outcome of this contradictory process has created a new skepticism and
weakened political Europe, which is increasingly becoming a periphery of
the corporate-dominated world, while increasingly dominated by U.S. legal
scholarship in a variety of legal domains. 199
196. See id. at 28; Jan-Werner Mijller, After the Double No: The EU's Best Hope, BOSTON
REV., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 25-28 available at http://bostonreview.net/BR30.6/mueller.
html (describing this claim in the context of a technocratic Europe).
197. See Kennedy, supra note 137, at 674-78 (explaining that a third globalization of legal
thought is characterized by a new legal consciousness, which speaks the language of
rights and neo-formalism as well as that of balancing conflicting policy values).
198. Compare CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2006),
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html (select "European Union"
from drop-down menu) (estimating the European Union's "official exchange rate"
GDP at $13.31 trillion during 2005), with CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE
WORLD FACTBOOK (2006), http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html
(select "United States" from drop-down menu) (estimating the United States' "official
exchange rate" GDP at $12.49 trillion during 2005).
199. See Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western Law, 42
AM. J. COMP. L. 195 (1994) (reviewing THE RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE
COMMON LAW WORLD, 1820-1920 (Mathias Reimann ed., 1993) and DER EINFLUSS
DEUTSCHER EMIGRANTEN AUF DIE RECHTSENTWICKLUNG IN DEN USA UND IN
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In this scenario, it is hard to believe that the creation of a socially
responsible European private law can be perceived as a top priority, when
such fundamental issues such as a common defense, common foreign
policy, common immigration policy, or comparable standards in education
and social protection, are neither solved nor discussed openly.
Nevertheless, the observation that there are more important questions to
tackle should not discourage action in the domain of private law. On the
contrary, private law in Europe must perform as a constitutional, societal
space where individuals and groups interact and are bound by private
agreements or publicly enforced constraints, thus developing a genuine
legal and social identity.200
True, as it is well known, the system of private law adjudication, as
traditionally conceived, has neither the sword nor the purse; the former
being the province of remedies and enforcement, and the latter that of
public law. Nevertheless, it is exactly a restructuring of the field of private
law that the left should pursue in order to make the law serve the interests
of the working class-the traditional loser in social processes-rather than
those of the strong corporate interests and of the elite. Within the traditional
conception of the field of private law, it would be unfair to burden the
shoulders only of European private law with the task of radical
redistribution of resources, which is the real issue that should be put on the
table today. But things are different when the political spaces of private law
are restructured. To put it simply, seen from a genuine leftist agenda, one
of the big hurdles in the creation of a more socially civilized Europe is that
the rich have too many resources-used in part to condition the political
process-and the poor too few. Moreover, on average, each Northern and
Western European has too many resources, if compared to his Southern and
Eastern fellows; and each European in general has too much if compared to
those that are maintained, by violent means, outside of the walls of our
shameful fortress.
This state of affairs, due to the historical path of capitalistic
accumulation, has been very poorly resisted by the working class because
the bourgeois hegemony has artificially divided the losers of the political
processes, setting the ones against the others in fear of being demoted in
their capacity as consumers. (An icon of this state of affairs has been the
fear of the Polish plumber.) From a socialist perspective, that should
remain embedded in internationalism, these global inequalities cannot be
justified, and any legal system can be considered legitimate only as long as
DEUTSCHLAND (Marcus Lutter et al. eds., 1993)).
200. See Gunther Teubner, Global Private Regimes: Neo-Spontaneous Law and Dual
Constitution of Autonomous Sectors?, in PUBLIc GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 71, 71-87 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004).
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it serves a purpose of progressively diminishing them. Unfortunately,
internal as well as international distributional questions can only be partly
tackled by means of the official (state or European Union) production of
public law, given the current structure of international relations and the
current mainstream agenda in international financial institutions controlling
the flux of capital. Nevertheless, what is not directly possible by official
legislation might be incrementally reached by restructuring private law-
the backbone of decentralized economic transactions.
Because private law can be considered as a sort of economic
constitution, there are a few points that should be remarked on and fully
considered in the scholarly path towards its restructuring. To begin with,
private law is one of the fundamental domains in which the problems of
externalities arise. It is the very basic legal structure of the market that
issues of environmental harm20 and labor standards (just to talk about two
of the most socially loaded areas of the law) get into the private law regime
for a proper venue of discussion. A system of private law that does not
approach, in its fundamental philosophy, the political choices that are
mandated today by such important areas of externality production, simply
fails in its basic role to provide a proper legal regime for a sustainable
market. This is an area in which leftist scholarship should not find too
many difficulties in setting alliances with approaches more ready to accept
capitalism as the fundamental economic constitution of Europe. It might be
more difficult to find common platforms in areas such as the division of
profit between capital and labor, but even here, examples of progressive
law to look to as models should not be too difficult to find. Job security,
limits to the length of the workday, maternity and paternity leaves, all the
way to enterprise congestion and profit sharing have been experienced here
and there in the past,20 2 and should today be restated, updated, and
proposed as viable alternatives to uncivilized exploitation. Much of this can
be accomplished even by way of interpretation of the existing arsenal of
anti-externalities private law remedies. To do so, however, private law
must be given a chance by incorporating the appropriate institutional
apparatus into its very structure. An apparatus that, from the left, could be
used to give a real meaning to the idea that private property rights can be
tolerated only as far as they can demonstrate a degree of social utility by
201. For a first step in this direction, see Gerrit Betlem, Environmental Liability and the
Private Enforcement of Community Law, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE,
supra note 133, at 677, 677-96, arguing for an insertion of this area of the law into the
Code.
202. For example, in former Yugoslavia under the leadership of Tito, before Western
exploitation and imperialism had turned the Balkans into bloodshed, see




providing a broad redistribution of income and by sustaining fundamental
human needs. (Think about landlord and tenant law.)
Historical experience shows that in order to produce a break with
dominant trends that is capable of recreating conditions of fairness, there is
the need for a strong community of legal scholars willing to explore new
avenues of inquiry and capable of translating notions-such as those of
equality and human dignity, always offended by capitalistic exploitation-
into rules of private law notions. There is the need for a political will, able
to inject into the law a degree of political legitimacy and a self-critical
philosophy, capable of understanding the current global ideology and
departing from it. Finally, there is the need of a recognizable political
function in the landscape of the sources of law. We find such visible
political inspiration and symbolic power in all the great codifications, from
the French, to the German, to the Italian, to the Mexican, to the DDR of
1975-just to offer the most visible examples. Most importantly, a reform
of private law-with its inevitable aspects of innovation, breaks with past,
and revolt against a previous order-inherently reflects a desire of
progress, a move away from a status quo that is perceived as non-desirable,
perhaps also technically, but certainly politically and ideologically.
Here are some examples. In 1804, France was trying to move beyond
the class privileges of the anci~n regime. In 1900, Germany was attempting
a new start as a mighty unitary empire, away from political divisions and
warfare. In 1942, Italy was reacting against the bourgeois and liberal legal
order. A similar social revolt, though grounded in a socialist rather than in a
fascist philosophy, characterized 1950 Mexico. The DDR produced, in
1975, an advanced and innovative Civil Code in an attempt to overcome
bourgeois formalism, professionalism, and faked economic equality.
Such a need for political inspiration, to be sure, does not necessarily
mean that there is a need or a desire of an autocratic political rule, such as
that in place in most of the previous examples. Such inspiration could well
come from the bottom up, as a cultural legacy of an intellectual community
of critical thinkers worth their salt and not capable of being transformed in
yet another ideological industry serving the dominant rhetoric. This global
community needs to be established. If this is the case, then a political
platform capable of inspiring a "not merely technical" 20 3 system of private
law can be inducted from the historical moment that a social community is
living, from the tensions and the stakes of such a moment, as reflected by
constitution-making exercises that might, and indeed do, appear under new
clothes in the present post-modem condition. In particular, political
inspiration and critical self-reflection can be induced in comparison with
other experiences, from a desire of identity of the European community in
203. See Kennedy, supra note 185.
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the post Cold War international order.
It would seem natural to seek such guidelines in a project with the
symbolic power such as the one represented by a constitution.20 4
Unfortunately, as already mentioned, the European constitutional process
carried on by the Convention and its presidium has been nothing more than
a major failure, the product of a political oligarchy, lacking democratic
legitimacy, and promoting the current neo-liberal order to constitutional
status. It misused the label "Constitution" for something that was little
more than the charter of an "old boys club," seeking, in a mythological
European past, legitimization for the privileges of the present ruling elites,
while letting out the others.20 5 Unfortunately colonialism, racism, and
authoritarianism show that the European past (and present) is less than
commendable and the present attitude towards anybody born outside of the
walls of fortress-Europe make the future too dark to be inspirational for
someone seeking values for a "real" constitution.
Despite these serious problems, the European charter of rights would
have offered a political mandate for a reform of private law governing the
common market. The welfarist nature of European capitalism, despite the
refusal of some of the most classic ideas-such as the social function of
property rights-is re-asserted in the charter and is claimed as a strong
aspect of European identity.20 6 It might be expanded towards its socialist
potentials. Both the political aspiration, and the previous path that reform
must attempt to interrupt, are therefore a given. The community of
progressive legal scholars should interpret, apply, and put into practice
such political aspirations and self-criticisms in the next years of the making
of European private law by setting a proper agenda. As enlightened as a
scholarly community might be, (and we might doubt that the current
European private law community is one, effectively normalized by its
204. See PIERRE BOURDIEu, Social Space and Symbolic Power, in IN OTHER WORDS:
ESSAYS TowARDS A REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 135 (Matthew Adamson trans., 1990) ("In
the symbolic struggle for the production of common sense or, more precisely, for a
monopoly over legitimate naming, agents put into action the symbolic capital that
they have acquired in previous struggles and which can be juridically guaranteed.").
205. See, for instance, the non-voice of the "new member states" during the constitutional
process. The former Eastern European countries were, in fact, given only an observer
role without any political power. Economic and Monetary Policy Cooperation
Between the EU and the Acceding Countries Following the Signature of the Accession
Treaty, DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, July 2003 (Monthly Report), at 15-16, available at
http://www.bundesbank.de/download/volkswirtschaft/mba/2003/200307en
economic.pdf.
206. European social capitalism is well described as an alternative both to socialism and to
neo-liberalism by ALBERT, supra note 162. A somewhat more idealized, though
highly accessible description is written by RIFKJN, supra note 163.
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transformation into an industry) we should not fall into the romantic
Savignian idea (or ideology) that legal scholars are the only interpreters of
the "spirit of the people." The people themselves should be empowered to
talk about the law in order to make their sense of justice (or of injustice).
This is why we now have to turn to an area-that of access to law-that
should become an integral part of a restructured progressive notion of
European private law.
20 7
D. Restructuring the Field: Whose Access to Justice?
Access to justice empowers individuals in society. If it grants a bite to
the private law system, it may allow at least a minimum check by the
people on the current decline of legal civilization. This is why it should be
a top priority of a leftist agenda. The smartest legal professional cannot
understand the law and see its decline as deeply as someone suffering due
to its injustice. In "face to faceless societies," such as the capitalistic ones,
where someone whose rights are violated by a bank or a telecom can only
complain to an answering machine or to a disempowered human being,
who is exploited in some call center, access to law is largely reserved to the
haves. Have-nots are excluded by a system of courts in which enforcement
of rights is progressively more expensive and privatized.2 °8
The consequence of this state of affairs is the separation of legal
scholars from the real life of the law. With no access to justice, the law
lacks a soul. It is not a living social creature but it is reduced to a
technocratic laboratory of "social engineering." With no people's control of
the law, legal civilization is bound to decline. Individuals get disengaged
and are transformed into passive spectators of the "spectacle." The civic
sense and the social participation in a process of civilization are substituted
by a brutish appetite for materialistic consumption. Violated rights, such as
those of airline travelers, can be cheaply bought by corporations offering
compensation with a few frequent flier miles.
Currently, Western legal civilization is in disarray, most importantly
because of the attitude towards it by the world economic power. European
legal culture should not participate in downgrading the rule of law into a
pale rhetoric, with access to justice only possible through entrepreneurial
plaintiffs' lawyers making out from a selected sample of the disgraces
suffered by the many victims of predatory capitalism. With no access to
justice, the "invisible hand" of legal and economic integration works
against the common interest, favoring, to the contrary, rent-seeking
207. The classic example of this idea is authored by LAURA NADER in THE LIFE OF THE
LAW (2002).
208. See Laura Nader, Alternatives to the American Judicial System, in NO ACCESS TO
LAW: ALTERNATIVES TO THE U.S. JUDICIAL SYSTEM 3, 3-5 (Laura Nader ed., 1980).
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attitudes of capitalistic predators. Much of today's discussions about
European private law do not come to terms with the grim reality of an
almost complete disjunction between the law in the books and what
happens in practice.
European private law is a young field of inquiry, whose early
contributions date back to the late 1980s, thus developed in temporal
connection with the dismantling of social welfare institutions beginning
under EU policies at the conclusion of the Cold War. True, some early
work was done by a few pioneers, but European private law, as a field and
an industry, is all historically subsequent to the Reagan-Thatcher
revolution. This is perhaps no coincidence. The exciting perspective of
building a new field could distract legal scholars from the devastation of
the very idea of legality and rights produced by that reactionary political
platform. Paradoxically, the revolutionary transformation produced by post
1989 neo-liberal triumph was vandalizing legality in countries such as the
United Kingdom and the United States, who are both much admired abroad
for their legal systems. Any social platform in European law today should
start from a full consciousness of the devastating effect of neo-liberalism
on legality, and should first attempt a counter-revolution aimed at making
good for the damage done. In this light, central to a socially concerned
platform, much before the need to change a few black letters in our codes,
should be the issue of access to justice.
The issue of access to justice is particularly instructive from our
perspective. In researching the field,2 °9 we noticed that a first intensive
wave of writing on the field shortly preceded the so-called Reagan-
Thatcher revolution, the moment in which public institutions started being
transformed and significantly privatized. Cappelletti's famous collective
project,21° in particular, witnessed a moment of general optimism for the
public interest model, an idea of activist, re-distributive, democratizing,
public-service minded approach to the public sector in general, and to
private law in particular. In that intellectual mode of thought, the Welfare
State in Western societies was seen as a point of arrival in civilization, and
access to justice was the device through which communities could provide
law as a public good, after having provided shelter, healthcare, and
education to the needy. True, in the same years, Laura Nader's work was
already skeptical of the possibility of providing access to law to the people
209. One of the authors is also the General Reporter for the "Access to Justice" project of
the International Academy of Comparative Law Conference which took place in July
2006 in Utrecht. See XVJIth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative
Law, http://www2.law.uu.nl/priv/AIDC/index l.asp (last visited Dec. 4, 2006).




in faceless industrial societies, and prophetically suspicious towards the
rise of the ADR industry, but it was still motivated by a sincere belief in the
possibility of bringing justice to the people.21
Beginning in the early 1980s, the global ideological picture changed.
Neo-liberal policies, inaugurated by Prime Minister Thatcher in Great
Britain, the crib of the Welfare State, and imported on a much weaker
institutional background in Reagan's America, were based on the very
basic assumption that the Welfare State was simply too expensive. A
Western capitalist model, busy to outspend the Soviet Block in order to win
the Cold War, had to save resources by privatizing as much of its welfare
services as possible. Public shelters, health, education, and justice for the
poor were the natural "victims" of such cut-backs. By the end of the 1980s,
with the "successful" outcome of the Cold War, this policy of
"privatization" had overcome the boundaries of the Anglo-American world,
as well as those of the traditional political right. At the "end of history," re-
distributional practices, both direct and indirect, could not be structurally
afforded in the domains of shelter and health, let alone the survival of those
secondary in importance, of education and justice.
With no desire to invest money in legal aid and programs for access
to courts for the poor, with a quite sustained cultural crusade against the
welfare state and its policies, the future of access to justice, in the original
sense of granting equal opportunities to litigation for the rich and the poor,
seemed quite grim. Some countries simply stopped worrying about the
unsatisfactory state of their systems of access to justice, while others,
where the system was more advanced, were undermining its legitimacy by
working out even more privatized and justice-remote models of dispute
resolution. The birth of the ADR industry, and the development of a
professional class of mediators, not necessarily trained in the law, who
served the interests of harmony and non-adversary social control, had
transformed the issue of access to courts of law for everybody into that of
limiting such access as much as possible, by creating an alternative not
based on adversary justice, but on harmony and governmentality,2 2 and
most importantly, quite entirely privatized. These general transformations
of Western law, involving a variety of aspects of the legal system,
including the rehabilitative ideal (itself expensive) in criminal law, and
more generally the target of pursuing social justice through law, have been
exported worldwide, incorporated in Structural Adjustment Programs and
211. See NADER, supra note 207 (containing Nader's intellectual itinerary and
bibliography).
212. In the sense of the famous College de France lectures of M. Foucault. See MICHEL
FOUCAULT, "SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED": LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE
1975-1976 (Arnold I. Davidson ed., David Macey trans., Picador 2003).
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other vehicles of diffusion of "global" legal thinking.
213
Only in very recent times, some scholars became aware of the fact
that in the years of the demise of the Welfare State, access to justice was
transformed into a non-issue (as witnessed by the disappearance of all the
scholarly literature) substituted by a quite opposite and almost certainly
"invented" problem, that of "litigation explosion." 214 Accordingly, the
solution to the flood of litigation was closing the doors of adversary justice
for everybody, in particular for the weaker market actors and the
development of a new "industry," that of ADR, governed by the ideology
of harmony and social peace. To be sure, closing the doors of justice for the
non-wealthy constitutes a further empowerment of the strong economic
actors. Because there is no legal venue relatively open to the average
individual, powerful market actors are free to avoid the social
consequences of their actions. With no desire to invest money in law as a
public good, what follows is lawlessness and bullying of the strong over the
weak. Consequently, after a legitimized process of law reform, it is access
to justice that claims a role of top priority for any agenda aimed at social
justice through the law.
Access to justice is today intimately connected to the idea of
consumer rights, itself central, as we have seen, to the cultural DNA of
European private law. It was not by chance that in the previous sections of
this Article, we have discussed the ideological stakes in unfair consumer
contractual terms.215 Nevertheless, there is a point that needs to be clarified.
A progressive private law agenda can by no means be satisfied, even by a
fully satisfactory level of consumer satisfaction, guaranteed by some cheap
and easily accessible remedial venue. Consumerism has characterized and
still characterizes much of the institutional evolution of European private
law, and many leftist scholars have perceived it as a progressive platform.
Consumerism, nevertheless, is a foe of the progressive agenda of post-
capitalistic transformation of society, performing as a trap, in which,
unfortunately, some of the best and more generous intellects of leftist legal
scholars have fallen. Consumerism only sets a more advanced frontier of
global capitalism, making its unsustainable model of development softer,
more user-friendly, and ultimately more resistant to radical change.
One should be aware that the e-transformation of citizens and
individuals into consumers is, to be sure, one of the most dangerous
213. See Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin
Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 383 (2003), available at http://www.be
press.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1088&context=-gj (discussing this evolution).
214. See Marc Galanter, News forom Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71
DENV. U. L. REv. 77 (1993).
215. See supra Part I.C.
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cultural transformations produced by post-modem capitalism. It destroys
class consciousness, and disempowers the resisting potential of the
proletariat by transforming even the free time of the working class into
non-compensated work, in which alienated workers, transformed into
consumers of useless commodities, relentlessly shop around for better
deals, invariably favoring the corporate power.21 6 When we point at access
to justice as one of the most important areas that should be explored in
order to restructure the field of private law, we do not wish to fall into this
trap. Corporations are all favorable to cheap venues where consumers can
exchange their less than satisfactory merchandise, and are even available to
bribe the few who still have the energy to protest by offering them some
material compensation. This allows standards of production to remain low,
with further exploitation of unskilled proletariat in sweat shops and lowers
the risk of the rise of actual social responsibility. It is sufficient to see the
long lines of consumers in the exchange departments of the major
American chains of consumer goods distribution. These people are made
happy by a mere substitution of a defective product with a working one,
with no one compensating them for the extra time and expenses arising
from the need to return and change a product for which they paid, perhaps
hundreds of dollars, and which was bought by the retailer in the South of
the world for a few cents.
Should the left care for this kind of access to justice? Should
obtaining easy ADR venues for slightly more complicated issues than
exchanging a poorly working CD player be something worth struggling
for? The answer is emphatically no. To the contrary, the kind of justice that
we need to guarantee is the genuinely redistributive one, in which ill-gotten
profits are disgorged and in which the people lucky enough to be born
within the walls of fortress Europe also vindicate, in the public interest, the
rights of their less fortunate fellows on whose suffering and degradation the
current pattern of capitalist development is based. What we should care
about is the sense of justice of civic individuals concerned for their
brothers, not that of brutish individualistic consumers. This kind of access
to justice is worth struggling for, within a broad conception of private law
aimed at offering the institutional framework of a civilized pattern of global
exchanges.
216. This image--of the consumer as someone working without knowing that he is doing
so-was introduced for the first time by French sociologist Baudrillard. See Jean
Baudrillard, Consumer Society, in JEAN BAUDRILLARD: SELECTED WRITINGS 29, 29-56
(Mark Poster ed. & trans., 1988).
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E. Diversity and Distribution: Why Should We Care?
Not only should the left attempt to restructure the field of private law
by making it comprehensive of issues of inclusion and social
transformation that traditionally are beyond its scope, but it should also be
aware of some of the most important observations thus far available. The
most important lessons in economic sociology in the realm of European
contract law came from Gunther Teubner's study on the harmonization
process, which began with the Unfair Terms Directive transposed in
different territories of the EU.217 According to Teubner, the harmonization
of contract law, rather than unifying, has irritated domestic legal regimes,
thus creating deeper cleavages among different legal systems. In taking this
lesson seriously, one might be tempted to conclude that harmonization or
private law rules are per se a self-defeating strategy, so that no political
agenda can be accomplished by this tool. While Teubner is an atheist with
regard to harmonization, he clearly shows that the effects of harmonization
in different socio-economic contexts produce more diversity rather than
unity. Therefore any welfarist provision, hard code, or any private law
directive will have different effects as well as a different impact in terms of
creating costs or benefits for different groups. It should thus be appreciated
in context, with a clear vision of who are the winners and who the losers of
the social processes it has produced in order to take the side in favor of the
latter. In other words, a progressive platform in European private law
should operate a distributional analysis and always take the side for the
weak.
Another important lesson from Teubner's work is that the evaluation
of the economic and social impact of harmonized private law rules in the
European Union is a job not only for economists, but also for lawyers. Such
perspective resonates in the works of United States private law scholar,
Robert Hale who demonstrated in the 1920s how a choice between two
different private law rules, including whether a judge or a legislator makes
it, entails a new distribution of bargaining power among private
individuals. 21 8 Thus, in addressing the impact of harmonization on private
law, progressive lawyers ought to clarify how each particular rule expresses
a choice that shapes the bargaining power of the parties directly and
217. See Teubner, supra note 101, and more recently, Pierre Legrand, On the Singularity
of Law, 47 HARv. INT'L L.J. 517 (2006).
218. See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV.
603, 627-28 (1943) ("Bargaining power would be different were it not that the law
endows some with rights that are more advantageous than those with which it endows
others. It is with these unequal rights that men bargain and exert pressure on one
another. These rights give birth to the unequal fruits of bargaining.").
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indirectly involved in the dispute.219
However, the diversity triggered by the implementation of European
directives is becoming a dramatic one because those who will have to bear
the highest costs of its dreadful consequences often happen to be
consumers rather than producers, the Southern or the new Member States
rather than the old core of Member States and the immigrants rather than
the EU citizens. Take, for example, the product liability saga triggered by
the Directive. In Gonzclez,220 Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S 22 1 and recently in
the theatrical repetition of the saga Commission v. France,222 the ECJ
proved its authority, by finally imposing, through a penalty, its
interpretation of the Directive, after more than twenty years of French
resistance. 223 The ECJ non-consumer-friendly interpretation of the Product
Liability Directive, often following the Commission view on the matter,
has dramatically changed domestic tort rules and their distributional impact
not just in France, but also in Spain and Denmark, who are directly
involved in the issue, and also throughout Europe. These ECJ cases
demonstrate that the regulation of defective products aims to respond to
severe personal injuries and health risks for consumers. Thus, in evaluating
injuries, risks, and allocation of costs through tort law, judges ought to
acknowledge the variety of domestic private law regimes-including not
only tort but also contract and property rules-as well as the highly diverse
national health care systems and pharmaceutical regulations.224
In adopting a distributive analysis to inform their decision,
progressive jurists should make two preliminary considerations. First, all
the above legal factors are crucial because they constitute the background
219. See Kennedy, supra note 185.
220. Case C-183/00, Maria Victoria Gonzdlez Sdnchez v. Medicina Asturiana SA, 2002
E.C.R. 1-3901, para. 25; Case C-52/00, Comm'n v. France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-3827, para.
16; Case C-154/00, Comm'n v. Greece, 2002 E.C.R. 1-3879, para. 12 (each
contemporaneously finding that "the margin of discretion available to the Member
States in order to make provision for product liability is entirely determined by the
Directive itself').
221. See Case C-402/03, Skov iEg v. Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S & Bilka Lavprisvarehus
A/S v. Mikkelsen, 2006 E.C.R. 1-199, para. 37-39.
222. See Case C-177/04, Cormn'n v. France, 2006 E.C.R. 1-2461.
223. See Caruso, supra note 43, at 751-52.
224. See Marie-Eve Arbour, Compensation for Damage Caused by Defective Drugs:
European Private Law Between Safety Requirements and Free-Market Values, 10
EUR. L.J. 87 (2004); Andr6 Sapir, Globalisation and the Reform of European Social
Models 1-2 (Sept. 9, 2005) (unpublished manuscript prepared for a presentation to the
European Union's Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors at the ECOFIN
meeting), available at http://www.bruegel.org (follow "Publications" hyperlink; then
follow "Papers" hyperlink; then follow "Globalisation and the Reform of European
Social Models" hyperlink).
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rules, which are closely interrelated to domestic tort law regimes. These
background rules shape the bargaining power of the parties involved in the
dispute and they have an impact in determining winners and losers in the
choice between alternative liability rules.
Second, because of the great variety of background rules in the EU-
due to the multiplicity of welfare systems as well as private law regimes-
the decision to change a liability rule in the name of European uniformity
will also increase the unequal redistribution of resources among Member
States, thus creating greater diversity and deeper social cleavages rather
than better harmonization in the internal market.225
For instance, changing a liability rule in Spain or in Greece, where
there is a universal or national healthcare system, is radically different than
changing a liability rule in continental or Anglo-Saxon Member States, in
which consumers buy private health insurance, sometimes subsidized by
the state. By restricting the protection afforded to consumers by domestic
tort rules, European judges have increased inequalities among fellow
Europeans. In fact, injured parties situated in Mediterranean countries will
find it more difficult to recover than those situated in continental or Anglo-
Saxon countries. The latter group of consumers could sue an insurer for
health related injuries under contract law rather than tort law. Thus, when
the ECJ imposes uniformity on a market that is still divided by social and
cultural barriers, which are not necessarily undesirable from a distributive
standpoint, it creates new inequalities among European individuals.
By adopting a distributive analysis, when jurists choose between two
alternative private laws, they have to openly acknowledge and offer to
political discussion the costs and the benefits of their decisions for the
parties directly and non-directly involved in the dispute. In realizing the
effects they are producing, they might suggest softening the need for
uniformity or maximal harmonization in European private law. If they
decide to continue striving for uniformity, rather than justifying their
choices through textualist interpretations or arguments, which entail
separation of powers and supremacy of Community law, they should
openly acknowledge the winners and the losers of the decision to unify a
given area. In our case, Spanish medical businesses and Danish distributors
clearly won at the expense of national consumers.
To be sure, in acknowledging the costs and benefits stemming from a
liability rule, a distributive analysis requires an inquiry into the facts and a
thick knowledge of the legal and socio-economic regimes in which the
dispute takes place. True, substantive information is available in scholarly
works and studies conducted by the European Commission on the varieties
of welfare regimes and different product liability systems within the
225. This point was first made by Gunther Teubner, supra note 101.
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Member States.226 If we do not trust such information that might be biased
or distorted by the "industry," then we should pay greater attention and
debate more openly the role of courts for carrying out a distributive
analysis and openly acknowledging their political choices in their decision
impacting the local context.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have surveyed the current debates creating sparks
in European private law scholarship and deep dissents among European
lawyers. We have explained why the notion of a social private law holds no
clarifying meaning and thus remains ambiguous and open to controversies.
We also have claimed that a notion of Social Europe is a controversial one,
due to the pluralities of welfare regimes as well as the alternative
hegemonic project that Europe represents today for global markets.
Our claim is that today in Europe, as in the past, the "Social" in
private law does not necessarily fulfill the needs of a progressive, let alone,
socialist agenda. Instead, in coalescing under the rubric of the "Social,"
scholars have compromised over important issues that should be
reconsidered because giving a human face to capitalist exploitation cannot
be seen as a progressive agenda.
We also have highlighted some of the main problems and offered
methodological alternatives as well as a policy proposal for what we called
a transformative agenda for a European private law. Our claim is that any
project for European private law should go beyond coalitions around social
justice. Instead, it should restructure the field of private law by creating
strategic alliances on specific targets (access to justice, distributive
outcomes, empowerment of labor) linking scholarly, political, and judicial
forces in the construction of a progressive agenda capable of serving the
interests of the multitudes and of serving human civilization.
226. See Report from the Commission on the Application of the Directive 85/3 74 on
Liability for Defective Products, COM (2000) 893 fimal (Jan. 31, 2001); PAULETTE
KURZER, MARKETS AND MORAL REGULATION: CULTURAL CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION (2001).
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